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The following quotations summarize the Defense Department’s ongoing strugg le 
to ensure its service members, and their families, are adequately housed.  
During the 2000 presidential campaign, then Texas Governor George W. Bush 
proclaimed, “Two-thirds of military family housing units are now substandard, and they 
must be renovated.”  (President’s Management Agenda, p. 39)  
In a 1949 Life Magazine letter to the editor, Douglas Lindsey, M.D., from North 
Guilford, Connecticut wrote, “The Secretary of the Army long ago labeled the housing 
situation as critical.  The Secretary of the Air Force has stated that no program within the 
Air Force, unless war comes, is as desperate as the housing program.  Navy enlisted 
personnel have designated lack of housing as the number one deficiency in satisfaction in 
a Navy career.  Perhaps Life’s publicity will facilitate the appropriations that will make 
their execution possible.”  (Life, 28 March 1949)  
In 1927, General Charles P. Summerall, Chief of Staff of the Army, conducted an 
inspection tour of most Army posts.  Speaking to large audiences at San Diego and San 
Francisco and drawing national press attention, Summerall called the Army’s housing 
situation a disgrace, stating that soldiers were living like “immigrants” or like “prisoners 
of war,” and not like soldiers of the United States.  (Bell, 2001)  
An 1870 Surgeon general’s report asserted that the United States had “the best -fed 
and worst-housed Army in the world.”  (Baldwin, 1993)  
Although the measuring sticks for what are considered substandard, inadequate, 
desperate, critical or disgraceful hous ing conditions have changed over the last 53 years, 
one fact has not changed; military families still live in housing that is considerably older, 
smaller and less appealing than their civilian counterparts.  
During the past four decades, housing for militar y personnel and their families has 
been a relatively low priority component of military construction.  After a rapid 
expansion of what was then considered modern and up-to-date accommodations 
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throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the effort devoted to the construction and the upkeep of 
military housing did not keep up with the natural deterioration and changing societal 
definitions of adequate housing.  The decrease in quality of housing accelerated since the 
end of the Cold War as a result of the uncertainties of base closures, both at home and 
overseas, and shrinking defense budgets, which have encouraged the channeling of 
construction funds into projects more directly related to operational readiness.  As a 
result, the DoD estimates that 180,000 of the 300,000 military family units that it owns 
and operates no longer meet its standards for adequate housing.  (Else, 2001)  
Approximately one-third of military families live in government-owned housing, 
with the remainder living in privately owned or rented accommoda tions.  Of these, DoD 
determined that more than half do not meet its current housing standards with regard to 
living space and amenities.  The Department calculated that, by using its traditional 
methods of contracting and construction, it would need 30 years and $16 billion to 
resolve its family housing shortfall.  (Else, 2001) 
DoD uses a combination of two methods to house active duty personnel and their 
families.  The principal method is reliance on the commercial housing supply near 
military installations; for which Congress provides members with a cash allowance to 
defray most of the cost.  The secondary method, intended for those locations where local 
housing is extraordinarily expensive or unavailable, is lodging members and their 
families in quarters built with appropriated funds on military reservations.  (Else, 2001)  
In 1996, Congress provided a third housing method to DoD.  This thesis examines 
the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI), a collection of twelve temporary 
“alternative authorizations” (as they are termed in the relevant legislation) intended for 
the speedy creation of quality military housing through the leveraging of appropriated 
funds with private investment.  DoD believes that a significant increase in the military 
housing allowance, a continuation of traditional construction, and expanded use of the 
MHPI will eliminate housing inadequacies by 2010.  (Else, 2001)  
The MHPI is not the first instance where Congress sought to leverage public 
appropriations in the creation of military housing, as explained below.  Still, it stands out 
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for the authority and flexibility in execution granted to the Department of Defense to 
engage in long-term contractual relationships with the private sector.  (Else, 2001)  
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Defense Department’s Military 
Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) and its evolvement from legislation, to pilot 
program, to full implementation.  The thesis considers the history of and need for military 
family housing (MFH), three previous MFH privatization efforts, the current state of 
MFH, and the current programs to obtain and maintain adequate housing for service 
families.  It profiles and compares the distinctly differing approaches taken by the Air 
Force, Army and Navy using MHPI to solve their MFH problems.  In doing so, this thesis 
includes key elements of MHPI agreements, such as housing allowances, impact aid, 
budget scoring, utilities, and installation security.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
· How might the Department of Defense best use its various housing 
programs to solve its military family housing problem to ensure its service 
families are adequately housed? 
2. Secondary Research Questions  
· What methods for providing military family housing are available to the 
Defense Department? 
· What housing methods do service members prefer and what factors 
influence their choice? 
· What is the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI), and what are 
the program’s goals? 
· What impact does “budget scoring” have on MHPI decisions and deals? 
· What impact does BAH have on the need for MFH and the prospects for 
MHPI? 
· What impact will MHPI likely have on the closed military community 
concept, retention rates, and family security? 
· What impact will MHPI have on DoD utility expenses? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope  
· Review the historical context of providing housing for military families  
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· Review four previous programs for providing MFH, including MILCON, 
Wherry, Capehart, and Section 801/802 
· Review the general, current state of military family housing units, and the 
housing allowances provided to military families when MFH is not 
available 
· Review the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) program 
from legislation, thru pilot programs and to its current status  
· Review the first ten MHPI projects as a basis for comparison 
· Analyze the MHPI’s long-term impact on total cost and flexibility in 
providing adequate military family housing.  Will it likely provide the best 
value for DoD? 
2. Limitations 
While this thesis includes a variety of financial and other numerical data, it is not 
intended to be a detailed financial analysis of the MFH issue.  Rather, it is intended to 
present a broad array of relevant facts and concepts that may provoke critical thinking 
and suggest which current or alternative military family housing programs warrant 
further study and consideration.   
Beginning from contract award, only four MHPI projects have an operating 
history of at least three years with constructio n completed at only three of these projects.  
Since the program is still relatively new and evolving, a minimum amount of hard data is 
available for trending and comparative analysis. 
3. Assumptions 
Several assumptions critical to this thesis concern the m ilitary’s size and structure, 
and the Federal budget over the next fifty years.   
· While the military forces’ size and structure is constantly adjusting to 
meet current and anticipated future threats, manning levels will not 
increase or decrease by greater than 20% 
· With Social Security, Medicare and other entitlement programs growing in 
scope and cost, defense budgets will face increasing pressures to hold 
steady or decrease as a fraction of the total Federal budget  
· Ongoing worldwide commitments such as stability and support operations 
and the war on terrorism, as well as equipment re-
capitalization/procurement and daily training and maintenance will 
prevent DoD and Congress from allocating sufficient funding, through 
MILCON, to solve the MFH problem before 2010 
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· The proportion of service members with families will stabilize or grow 
rather than shrink 
· The correlation between a service member’s family life circumstances and 
his duty performance and combat effectiveness will continue gaining 
leadership attention and resources 
· DoD’s need for high quality personnel will increase as the complexity and 
sophistication of weapon systems and military duty increases  
· DoD will continue competing with the private sector to recruit and retain 
highly quality personnel 
· The high quality personnel that DoD seeks to recruit and retain will 
increasingly view a military career in terms of a total benefit package for 
themselves and their families, not just a temporary adventure and job skill 
training ground 
· In the short-term (before 2010), a rapid, wholesale abandonment of MFH 
located on installations or sponsored/controlled by the services is not a 
feasible option.  While much controversy surrounds the process and 
methodology used by DoD to determine MFH needs on installations, this 
thesis does not research the validity of housing requirement 
determinations.  This thesis assumes that private sector housing markets 
do not currently posses the excess capacity to absorb all of the local 
military families if on-base housing were simply discontinued.  Hence, at 
least some MFH provided either through MILCON, MHPI, or some other 
program is necessary. 
E.  METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on an extensive literature review, including congressional 
testimonies, Federal agency reports from both the Congressional Research Service and 
the General Accounting Office, Defense Department and Service component internal 
regulations, reports, policies and plans, journal articles, written texts, and web searches.  
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
See Appendix A. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is organized into six chapters.  Chapter II provides a historical context 
for how military family housing originated, the Defense Department’s World War II 
housing policies, and how these policies evolved during the Cold War.  It also includes 
an overview of the traditional MILCON funded housing program, three previous military 
family housing privatization programs, and the implementation of budget scoring in 
1990.  Chapter III explains the two traditional methods DoD uses to provide military 
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family housing, how they function, problems associated with these methods, and service 
members’ housing preferences.  Chapter IV traces the Military Housing Privatization 
Initiative from legislation through pilot program status , to its current state.  It explains 
specific program nuances and includes an overview of the three services’ distinct 
approaches to solving their military family housing problems by using MHPI authorities.  
Chapter V provides an analysis of the current state of housing allowances and traditional 
MILCON housing, and how these programs interplay with MHPI.  The analysis also 
outlines how specific MHPI nuances affect the overall program, the future prospects for 
and implications to military family housing, and the advantages and disadvantages of the 
distinct MHPI approaches of the services.  Chapter VI summarizes the author’s 
conclusions and provides recommendations for how the MHPI may be best used to 
improve military family housing.  
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II. BACKGROUND:  HISTORY OF MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING IN THE U.S. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the historical context of military family housing, from the 
Revolutionary War period to present day.  It includes overviews of the Quartering Acts, 
the U.S. Constitution’s Third Am endment, housing the military from 1790 thru World 
War II, the Cold War era military family housing programs, legislative effects on Cold 
War housing programs, and eligibility criteria to live in military family housing.  
B. WHY DOD PROVIDES MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING 
1. The Quartering Acts 
The history of military family housing in the United States dates back to the mid 
18th century.  As tensions grew between the North American Colonies and the Monarchy, 
British troop units deployed to the colonies to maintain  civic order and reinforce King 
George’s rule.  The British troops were generally concentrated in urban areas such as 
New York, Boston and Philadelphia, and the increasing troop numbers lead to housing 
shortages.  The monarchy viewed the colonial problems as temporary and resisted 
building larger military installations for housing their troops.  Rather, the British 
Parliament passed two Quartering Acts in 1765 and 1774.  
The Quartering Act of 1765 required colonial governments and citizenry to 
provide housing and expendable supplies to British troops stationed in the American 
Colonies.  Where sufficient barracks were not available, troops were to be housed in 
privately owned structures.  Specifically, the act stated that  
… civil officers … are hereby required to billet and quarter the officers 
and soldiers, in barracks provided by the colonies; and if there shall not be 
sufficient room in the said barracks for the officers and soldiers, then and 
in such case only, to quarter and billet the residue of such off icers and 
soldiers for whom there shall be no room in such barracks, in inns, livery 
stables, ale houses, victualling houses, and the houses of sellers of wine by 
retail to be drank in their own houses or in places thereunto belonging, and 
all houses of persons selling of rum, brandy, strong water, cyder or 
metheglin … uninhabited houses, outhouses, barns, or other buildings, as 
shall be necessary, to quarter therein the residue of such officers and 
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soldiers for whom there should not be room in such barracks and publick 
[sic] houses as aforesaid …  (Quartering Act of 1765)  
The Quartering Act of 1774 was similar in substance to the 1765 Act, stating that  
… where no barracks are provided by the colonies … officers or soldiers 
in His Majesty’s service shall remain within any of the said colonies 
without quarters for the space of twenty-four hours after such quarters 
shall have been demanded, it shall and may be lawful for the governor of 
the province to order and direct such and so many uninhabited houses, 
outhouses, barns, or other buildings as he shall think necessary to be taken 
(making reasonable allowances for the same) and make fit for the 
reception of such officers and soldiers, and to put and quarter such officers 
and soldiers therein for such time as he shall think proper. 
However, this new Quartering Act allowed for the billeting of troops in occupied 
dwellings.  (Quartering Act of 1774)  
The Quartering Acts were part of a set of Parliamentary decrees, known as the 
“Intolerable Acts” that incensed colonis ts’ anger toward King George, substantially 
contributing to the revolutionary movement, and left an enduring scar on the colonial 
political leaders. 
2. United States Constitution, Amendment 3 
Amendment three to the U.S. Constitution states, “No soldier sha ll, in time of 
peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but 
in a manner to be prescribed by law.”  Fifteen years after the second quartering act, 
preventing the forcible housing of soldiers by private citizens was still paramount to the 
constitutional writers.  They ensured that private citizens and property owners could not 
be required to house soldiers except by passage of congressional legislation during 
wartime.  This amendment forced the Secretary of War to  provide organic housing for 
military forces, and not rely on the private rental market.  It has guided military personnel 
housing policy for over 150 years.   
Not until the Capehart program ended in the early 1960s did DoD recognize that it 
would never attain its goal of providing housing for all military families.  The local 
economy surrounding military installations became the primary housing source, funded 
by housing allowances, and on-base housing became secondary.  
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3. Housing the Military Prior to World War II 
Before the Cold War, on-base (or shipboard) housing was the norm for personnel 
during peacetime and housing allowances played a much more limited role than they do 
today.  For the married members of the small peacetime officer corps, this meant on-base 
DoD family housing.  For enlisted personnel, who were not expected to have families, it 
meant assignment to barracks living quarters.  Although married men could be drafted 
into the enlisted force during wartime, they were expected to leave their de pendants at 
home.  The U.S. Court of Claims even used the notion that DoD housing was the norm 
for military personnel in 1925 to confirm the tax-free status of housing allowance.  In the 
court’s view, allowances were not taxable compensation but simply reimbursement for an 
expense.  (CBO, 1993) 
As late as 1948, the Hook Commission, an advisory group appointed by the 
Secretary of Defense, assumed that sufficient DoD housing would eventually be available 
to house most military families in peacetime, and that allowances for housing would be 
the exception rather than the norm in the post-WW-II era.  To support that assumption, 
members of the commission argued that military personnel preferred DoD housing 
located on military bases and stressed the relationship between on-base housing and 
military readiness.  The Cold War intervened and the Hook Commission’s expectations 
were never realized.  Instead, the Career Compensation Act of 1949 established the Basic 
Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) system, providing housing al lowances to service 
members when on-base housing was not available.  BAQ became an important element 
of military compensation, and an invaluable pillar in alleviating the plight of military 
families and their housing problems.  (CBO, 1993)  
4. Post-WW-II Standing Military Expansion 
Although the Army quickly demobilized millions of men after VJ Day, the 
peacetime Army of the late 1940’s was at least seven times larger than its predecessor of 
the 1930’s.  As the wartime cooperation between the Soviet Union and  the United States 
deteriorated into the Cold War, it gradually became apparent that the peacetime Army 
required after World War II would be larger than any peacetime Army in American 
History.  Among the many problems confronting the Army was the problem of providing 
family housing.  (Baldwin, 1996)  
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Both military and civilian housing was in short supply in the years immediately 
following World War II.  With the end of WW-II, the late 1940’s saw 15 million 
American service men and women returning home.  This  situation, coupled with a 
housing shortage that grew steadily between 1928 and 1948, exacerbated an already 
existing general civilian housing shortage in the United States.  In 1946, fully 9% of 
American families lived two or three couples to a single family home.  (ACHP Report, 31 
May 2002) 
The general housing shortage, and a historically large peacetime military force 
made obtaining housing extraordinarily difficult for military families.  For the first time 
in the history of our nation, the build -up of nuclear weapons in the years immediately 
following World War II resulted in a need to maintain a large, peacetime fighting force.  
At the same time, the increasing technological capabilities and equipment of the services 
required the services to retain hig hly trained technological experts rather than having 
them return to civilian life.  (ACHP Report, 31 May 2002)  
Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson summarized the acute military housing 
problem in 1949 when he said,  
Rather than be separated from their families because of lack of 
Government quarters and scarcity of adequate rental housing at their 
places of assignment, many of the service personnel have accepted 
disgraceful living conditions in shacks, trailer camps, and overcrowded 
buildings, many at extortionate rents.  It cannot be expected that 
competent individuals will long endure such conditions …there is nothing 
more vital or pressing in the interest of morale and the security of America 
than proper housing for our armed forces.  (ACHP Report, 31 May 2002) 
In 1949, a pictorial and written article in Life Magazine exposed the squalid living 
conditions of enlisted men and their families at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and created a 
public outcry demanding Defense Department and Congressional action.  Fort Dix  had 
only 340 quarters for its 3,600 eligible families.  The article profiled enlisted families 
renting shacks from unscrupulous landlords who had purchased the shacks from the 
Army after the Army declared them “unfit for human habitation.”  Most had no 
electricity, gas or plumbing, with up to 25 people sharing a single outdoor toilet.  (Life, 
07 March 1949) 
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5. DoD Housing Policy 
a. Department of Defense Housing Policy Until 1949 
From early in its history, the Army accepted a commitment to provide 
government-owned housing for most of its officers and soldiers.  Unmarried, or at least 
‘unaccompanied,’ soldiers lived in barracks, and officers, in bachelor officer’s quarters.  
The Army attempted, often with limited success, to provide family quarters for all it s 
married officers and those enlisted personnel classified as eligible.  Where government 
housing was not available, eligible officers and soldiers received monetary compensation, 
called basic allowance for quarters (BAQ), or housing allowance, to obtain housing in the 
private market.  While the Army came to rely heavily on the private market to house its 
soldiers, its goal in the early post-war years was to provide government quarters for all 
eligible personnel.  The Army’s objective, according to its Director of Logistics in 1948, 
was “to provide quarters on posts for all authorized military personnel.”  (Baldwin, 1996)  
b. Department of Defense Housing Policy After 1949 
As the Cold War and Communist threats loomed, the Department of 
Defense was forced to amend its military family housing policy.  The department realized 
it could no longer afford to build, maintain and provide family housing for all married 
service members.  DoD began relying on the private rental market, with generous 
encouragement and involvement from the Federal Government.  This decision helped 
alleviate the immediate problem; housing was difficult to find, expensive to rent, and 
frequently in deplorable conditions.  Three weeks after the 07 March Life Magazine 
published the Fort Dix article, Senator Kenneth S. Wherry (R-NE) responded in a letter to 
the Life editor.  He briefly profiled proposed legislation providing special financial 
incentives to private developers that would increase the military family housing inventory 
by 100,000 units over the next year.  The bill assumed its drafter’s name and is profiled 
later in this chapter.  The Wherry bill was the first of many creative attempts to solve the 
military’s family housing problem. 
C. TRADITIONAL MFH WITH MILCON 
Congress funds the Defense Department’s budget through yearly appropriations.  
Since 1960, the Defense Department’s budget has been divided into seven appropriations 
titles: 
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· Military Personnel 
· Operations and Maintenance (O&M)  
· Procurement 
· Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
· Military Construction (MILCON) 
· Family Housing (MFH) 
· Revolving and Management Funds  
The Family Housing title is sub-divided into four major functional categories: 
· Construction  (New, Post-acquisition, Planning and Design) 
· Operations and Maintenance (including utilities) 
· Debt Payments 
· DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund (funds MHPI)  
Both the new construction and the post-acquisition functional categories of the 
Military Family Housing appropriation title are specifically earmarked by installation and 
by project.  There is virtually no opportunity for spending discression below 
Congressional level.  (FMR, June 2002) 
Because Congress controls Military Family Housing spending so tightly, the 
process of perceiving a housing need, justifying it, request ing and receiving funds, and 
planning/executing the project can be inordinately long.  The lag time from project 
conception and justification, through budget cycles and appropriations, culminating in a 
military family housing unit ready for assignment and occupation ranges from four to ten 
years, with the latter being closer to the norm.  During this time, the project is subject to 
derailment by competing budgetary and political priorities within DoD and Congress.  As 
a result, DoD family housing requirements historically outpaced military family housing 
funding for unit construction, renovation and operation.  (Sorce, 2000)  
D. PREVIOUS MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION 
PROGRAMS 
1. Wherry:  1949-1955 
The Wherry program required no direct Congressional funding and was intended 
to increase MFH supplies around bases that were not scheduled for downsizing or 
closure.  Private developers (sponsors) designed, built, owned, operated and maintained 
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the housing on either private land or land leased from DoD at nominal rates.  Wherry 
land leases ran for a period of not less than 50 years and some leases ran for 75 years.  To 
encourage developer participation and competition, the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) insured the private mortgages for up to 90% of the property’s replacement value 
or a maximum of $8,100, which limited Wherry house construction costs to $9,000 each.  
FHA also required the housing to meet its standards for design, construction, and 
livability.  (Baldwin, 1996)  
Even when built on land leased from the Government, Wherry housing was not 
considered government quarters.  Although private sponsors had to give priority to 
service members who wanted to live in Wherry units, the units were considered 
commercial rental housing, open to non-military occupancy.  Few non-military people 
ever rented Wherry units.  Soldiers and officers chose to rent voluntarily and paid their 
rent using their basic allowance for quarters to the private sponsor.  Rental rates, 
however, were not determined by the amount of the housing allowance.  FHA established 
rental schedules for the units based on its estimate of the income sponsors would need to 
operate and maintain the housing, repay the mortgage, and make a profit.  At a 
congressionally mandated maximum interest rate of 4%, the sponsors would pay off the 
mortgage in slightly less than 33 years.  (Baldwin, 1996) 
Congress and Wherry sponsors had differing views regarding time horizons for 
project profitability.  Wherry contracts and FHA rental rates were structured to provide 
sponsors with nominal profits during the first 33 years, while they repaid construction 
loans.  Meaningful profit opportunities occurred during the 17 to 42 years after 
completing loan repayments.  Congress viewed this as a fair incentive for sponsors to 
maintain the properties and to fulfill the 50 to 75 year leases.  Sponsors viewed the 33 -
year nominal profit period as excessively long and unfair, making it difficult to attract 
sponsor developers and private financing.  (Baldwin, 1996)  
Wherry projects encountered numerous problems and the program was cancelled 
in 1955, after building 84,000 sets of quarters.  Congress investigated reports of 
developers earning windfall profits through building code and maintenance shortcuts.  
Service components complained that the $9,000 houses were too small, poorly 
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constructed and poorly maintained.  With the advent of larger Capehart housing units 
(discussed below) Wherry vacancy rates increased and sponsors complained of financial 
losses.  Wherry units included no rental or occupancy guarantees, and private citizen 
tenants were rare.  (Baldwin, 1996)  
Although FHA and DoD recognized local taxation as a possible problem when the 
program was established, the rental schedules included no allowance for the expense of 
local taxation.  In the spring of 1956, the Supreme Court ruled that local Governments 
could tax Wherry projects.  Wherry owners immediately applied for rental increases, but 
such increases would make Wherry housing less attractive to service members and lik ely 
increase the already high vacancy rates.  Preferring Government operations and 
maintenance, and intent on ending the Wherry controversy, Congress authorized the 
purchase of Wherry units in 1956.  By 1959, the service components purchased and 
renovated about 70% of the units whose average size was 831 square feet.  (Baldwin, 
1996) 
2. Capehart:  1955-1964 
In 1955, Congress authorized a new MFH program, sponsored by Senator Homer 
Capehart (R-IN), intended to correct Wherry program flaws.  Under the new pro gram, the 
FHA provided mortgage insurance for private sponsors who built, but did not operate, 
family housing units on government-owned or leased land.  The Secretary of Defense had 
to certify the need for family housing at an installation in order to init iate a project.  The 
services retained architect-engineer firms to design the projects, whose designs were then 
advertised for competitive bidding.  (Baldwin, 1996)  
The winning bidder formed a separate corporation for each project and obtained 
mortgage insurance for 100% of his bid from the FHA.  Insured against risk by this 
mortgage guaranty, the corporation obtained a 25-year mortgage from a private lender.  
Congress limited the mortgage rate to 4% to encourage affordable mortgages.  The 
corporation also reimbursed the service component for the design costs.  Initially, FHA 
capped the mortgage insurance limit at $13,500 per unit but later raised it to $16,500.  
The increase accounted for housing industry inflation and allowed for larger, more 
desirable, quarters than Wherry permitted.  (Baldwin, 1996) 
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After completing Capehart construction projects, the sponsor turned the 
corporation over to the service component, which assumed the mortgage obligation.  The 
project became government quarters assigned to fam ilies of service members who 
forfeited their housing allowance.  The services used the forfeited housing allowances to 
pay off the mortgages, and operated and maintained the projects using appropriated 
funds.  Capehart added 115,000 units to the MFH inventory between 1955 and 1962.  
(Baldwin, 1996) 
Capehart housing drew Congressional criticism from its inception.  Some 
complained that mortgage repayment, over a 25-year period, was substantially more 
expensive than building with appropriated funds.  Others questioned the need for 
mortgage insurance since the Government, which was essentially immune from default, 
assumed the obligations at project completion.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) 
even accused the services of spending excesses on “costly and des irable, but not essential 
features, such as air conditioning and dishwashers.”  By 1960, Capehart was rapidly 
falling out of favor.  Inflation increased interest rates to 4.5% and forced mortgage limits 
up to $19,800.  Disputes with contractors and ballooning costs caused the Kennedy 
administration to retire the Capehart program in 1962, with Congress voting to build 
MFH exclusively with appropriated funds.  That year, Congress authorized almost 14,000 
new MFH units, the largest single authorization since the Korean Conflict, but 
appropriated funds for only one-half that amount.  (Baldwin, 1996) 
Although Wherry and Capehart provided almost 200,000 new housing units for 
military families, popular sentiment had turned against privatization initiatives.  In 1959, 
Roland Boyd, a Texas lawyer and general council to the Wherry Housing Association 
said,  
if a mistake had been made in the program, it was the turning of 
ownership, operation and management of military housing over to private 
industry.  The military and private enterprise are not compatible in the 
field of ownership and management of military housing.  
Both Senator Wherry and Senator Capehart conceded that building housing with 
appropriated funds would be best, but both argued that the Defense Department would 
not or could not maintain a long-term program of housing construction because of the 
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many demands on its resources.  The decade of the 1960s would prove them right.  The 
first post-Capehart appropriated housing program was drastically reduced before it left 
Congress, and in a few years the war in Southeast Asia pushed housing to a low priority.  
(Baldwin, 1996) 
3. Vietnam Years 
In the early 1960s, privatization programs fell out of favor with Congress, and the 
Defense Department returned to building MFH with appropriated (MILCON) funds.  
Although Congress pledged to continue the rapid pace of housing construction, the war in 
Southeast Asia soon relegated housing to a low priority.  However, the Defense 
Department acknowledged that it would have to rely  on the private community to provide 
most of its family housing.  In areas where housing was not available, not adequate or not 
affordable, or where military necessity required it, the Defense Department would still 
provide military housing.  In 1973, the nation adopted the all-volunteer force (AVF).  To 
make military service more attractive to volunteers, Congress supported a brief surge of 
family housing construction with appropriated funds in the mid -1970s.  But the budget 
priorities of the Carter administration in the late 1970s again reduced the level of family 
housing construction.  (Baldwin, 1993) 
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought to office an administration 
determined to rebuild American military strength and committed to using private 
enterprise to perform as many governmental functions as possible.  But the cost of 
erasing the Defense Department's housing deficit with appropriated funds was staggering 
and competed with the numerous other requirements for rebuilding the armed forces.  
Again, as they had done three decades earlier, Congress and the administration turned to 
the private sector for the capital to revitalize family housing.  (Baldwin, 1993) 
Congress first authorized leasing at all military installations  in 1962.  But 
domestic short-term leasing remained a relatively small program.  Leasing overseas 
expanded dramatically, however, in the mid -1970s as the Defense Department turned to 
this approach to provide much-needed family housing abroad.  When the administration 
and Congress tackled the problem of military family housing in the early 1980s, they had 
a variety of options to consider from the rich, but often misunderstood, history of Defense 
Department housing privatization programs.   (Baldwin, 1993)  
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By 1980, family housing became a high priority for the Defense Department due 
to demographic changes among the troops .  While the proportion of married officers was 
always high, the proportion of married enlisted personnel had grown steadily since the 
end of World War II and especia lly after the formation of the AVF.  DoD leadership 
increasingly recognized the influence of family issues on morale and reenlistment and in 
1983 declared that support for military families was described as “an organizational 
imperative.”  (Baldwin, 1993)  
4. Section 801 and 802 Leasing Programs of the 1980s  
In the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (Public Law 
98-115), Congress enacted and President Ronald Reagan signed into law, legislation that 
established two new pilot programs  for military family housing.  Dubbed the “801” and 
“802” programs after the sections of the act that established them, the programs 
attempted to tap the resources of the private sector to improve military family housing.  
Armed with a series of inducements and guarantees, the Defense Department hoped to 
persuade private developers to build family housing on or near military installations and 
make that housing available to service members.  Better family housing, the Defense 
Department argued, would improve morale and encourage reenlistment.  While these 
factors are critical to any armed force, they were especially important for a rapidly 
expanding, all-volunteer force, which was just a decade old.  As the Reagan 
administration launched its post-Vietnam buildup of American forces, family housing, 
like manpower and hardware, would benefit from increased military spending.  (Baldwin, 
1996) 
The Section 801 and 802 programs were touted as the complete solution to DoD’s 
long-standing housing problem.  During congr essional testimony in 1983, Lawrence 
Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics said 
the new 801/802 programs would “maximize private initiative, benefit the community, 
minimize government involvement, increase freedom  of choice for all people in choosing 
housing, and greatly reduce the Government’s short - and long-term costs.”   
Section 801/802 MFH was rented primarily to military service members.  
Although service members were not officially required to accept 801/802  units, they were 
strongly advertised and supported by the installation housing offices.  For service 
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members, 801/802 units were easy to obtain and less costly than other private sector 
housing when traditional on-post housing was not available.  Eligible  military personnel 
voluntarily rented the units, using their housing allowances, and paid their own utilities 
out of pocket.  Rental rates were determined jointly between DoD and the developers, 
and were described as “reasonably equivalent to comparable r ental units in the 
community.”  The private developer operated, maintained and managed the housing 
units.  The developer risked losing his lease/rental guarantee if maintenance and 
management support was inadequate.  The Defense Department had the right of  first 
refusal to acquire the units at the end of the leases.  (Baldwin, 1996)  
Both 801 and 802 were initially designated as two-year pilot programs.  Congress 
renewed them annually before modifying them and making them permanent housing 
options in 1991.  Reluctant to relinquish any budget control to DoD, 801/802 deals 
required Congressional approval after the service components negotiated/structured the 
deals with private developers.  
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 required 
specific language in the contract agreements stating that “the obligation of the United 
States to make payments under the agreement in any fiscal year is subject to the 
availability of appropriations for that purpose,” and is commonly referred to as the 
‘subject-to-availability-of-funds’ clause.  This provision made private developers 
skeptical of the Government’s long-term intentions, significantly hampering efforts to 
encourage private investment in 801/802 projects, and leading to a slow start for the 
programs. 
 
   Sect-801  Sect-801  Sect-802  Sect-802 
Provisions  1984-1990 After 1990 1984-1986 After 1986 
Term Limit  20-years  20-years  15-years  25-years 
New/Rehab  New  New/Rehab New  New/Rehab 
On/Off Post   On and Off Off-Post  On and Off On and Off 
O&M   KTR or Govt Only Govt KTR  KTR or Govt 
Building Specs   Local Code  Local Code  DoD Code  Local Code  
 






a. Section 801, Before 1991:  “Build-to-Lease” 
Section 801 was significantly more successful than its 802 cousin.  It was 
called ‘build-to-lease’ because developers built the housing units after winning 
competitive bid processes, entered into lease agreements with service components and 
obtained Congressional approval.  The projects required new unit construction, built 
either on-post or off-post, in accordance with local building codes, rather than DoD 
construction standards.  Off-post units were to be located within 30 miles and a 60-
minute commute from the installation, and were subject to local property taxes.  The 
leases were 20 years in length, allowing either contractor or Government operations and 
maintenance.   
The service component paid rent, in the form of lease payments, in return 
for filling all units with military personnel.  The rent was funded from a pool of m oney 
derived from forfeited housing allowances.  Service members forfeited receipt of their 
housing allowance and paid their own utilities out-of-pocket.  Rental prices were based 
on the Government’s leasing contract with the developer and not connected to  housing 
allowance rates.  
b. Section 801, Problems and Revisions 
Section 801 projects immediately encountered a host of difficulties but 
managed to produce housing units throughout the 1980s.  Projects were significantly 
delayed as developers negotiated lo wer, more favorable tax rates with local governments, 
and tried to avoid Davis-Bacon wage rates.  The Department of Labor eventually ruled in 
favor of the labor unions, upholding Davis -Bacon wages, thereby prompting developers 
to ask for additional funding since the higher Davis -Bacon wage rates were not priced 
into bids.  The services argued that the lower property taxes and the associated delays 
while contractors negotiated them were adequate offsetting values for the higher wages.  
Another source of controversy regarded the Government’s responsibility 
to ensure the projects’ adherence to construction codes.  DoD claimed it had only to 
‘monitor’ the projects, since they were built to commercial standards, not DoD codes; 
and that local governments and investors shouldered the duty to ‘inspect.’  The General 
Accounting Office (GAO) agreed that DoD need only monitor the projects, but must 
more specifically define exactly what monitoring entailed.  (GAO/NSIAD -87-13BR)   
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To obtain lower land costs, and consequently lower bid prices, some 
contractors sought land at the outer reaches of the 30 -mile/60-minute range arc.  At Fort 
Drum, New York, 801 residents complained of isolation from the Post and its associated 
facilities benefits, coupled with frequent and excess ive commuting hazards, especially 
during winter weather.  
By 1986, section 801 still appeared favorably enough to DoD that the 
Department’s policy was to obtain all future MFH through a 60/40 mix of MILCON and 
801 programs.  Congress was skeptical as to how  801 leasing could be less costly, in the 
long run, when compared to MILCON “ownership.”  They required that all 801 projects 
show at least a 5% cost savings when compared to MILCON before approving the lease 
arrangements.  GAO was also skeptical, firmly believing that leasing was more expensive 
in the long run due to contractor profits, poor construction quality, and poor maintenance 
prospects.  While not mandatory, GAO recommended the services include performance 
bonds in their contracts, to increase the probability of successful project completion with 
minimal financially related delays (GAO/NSIAD -87-13BR).  The services, primarily the 
Army, had not used performance bonds, believing that a guaranteed long -term lease 
arrangement negated their usefulness, and only increased overall project cost. 
Congress modified the 801 program in 1991, ending its pilot stage and 
making it a permanent MFH option.  The changes included allowing for rehabilitated 
units to increase program flexibility and reduce costs, especia lly in urban areas.  
Addressing GAO concerns, off -post construction was mandated.  GAO argued that on -
post projects were not operating leases, but were actually disguised capital leases, with 
significant legal and funding implications since the Government was effectively obligated 
to purchase the property at the end of the lease (GAO/NSIAD -87-13BR).  Finally, DoD 
agreed to assume operations and maintenance functions, easing congressional fears of 
developers skimming maintenance dollars to boost profits and leaving service members 
to reside in substandard/unsafe conditions.  GAO contended that, similar to Wherry 
projects, developers would lose interest in maintenance after the first seven or eight years 




c. Section 802, Before 1987:  “Rental Guarantee” 
This program was called ‘rental guarantee’ because the service component 
guaranteed that military personnel would occupy a minimum percentage (up to 97%) of 
the units, with the service filling the rental gap if occupancy was too low.  To minimize 
the chances of a vacancy gap, 802 projects were restricted to bases where current 
military-controlled housing had exceeded a 97% occupancy rate for the preceding 18 
consec utive months.  This requirement was waiverable for new installations or those 
expecting a large increase in military personnel during the 1980s expansion.  Section 802 
projects required new unit construction, built either on-post or off-post, in accordance 
with DoD construction standards, and subject to local property taxes.  The rental 
guarantees lasted for a 15-year maximum, were not renewable, and specified contractor 
operations and maintenance.  DoD was responsible for 80% of the property tax increases 
over the contract life.  
Service members received their housing allowance, and forwarded it to the 
contractor as rental payment, paying for their own utilities out -of-pocket.  To protect 
against escalating rental rates, only that portion of the rent devoted  to operation and 
maintenance (maintenance rent) was allowed to rise over the contract period.  Shelter rent 
was fixed over the contract life.   
d. Section 802, Problems and Revisions 
From the beginning, section 802 projects were unpopular with private 
developers.  Since shelter rent was fixed over the contract life, and initial construction 
costs were capped at about 85% of the average occupants housing allowance, contractors 
envisioned inadequate profitability opportunities.  By 1987, section 802 had produced no 
housing, and was dying on the vine.  Congress revived the program by relaxing its 
parameters.  Using local building codes and including rehabilitated units reduced 
construction costs and attracted private investor interest.  Unfreezing shelter rent , 
permitting government O&M, and extending contract life spans to 25 years increased 
developers’ long-term profitability prospects.  Lastly, for those projects built on 
Government land, lease renewal became an option, but was limited to the length of the 
original contract.  By 1993, section 802 had produced only 276 units, and although 
authorized, its use was not pursued.   
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E.  THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT (BEA) OF 1990 AND THE 
FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT (FCRA) OF 1990.  (BOTH 
INCLUDED IN PUBLIC LAW 101-508) 
The BEA and FCRA redesigned Federal budgeting and spending processes and 
were intended to limit spending and eventually reduce the ballooning Federal deficit.  
Congress, when authorizing money, and Federal agencies, when requesting funding, 
would have to inc lude the sum of all future obligations in the budget year in which the 
program was authorized.  Essentially, a current Congress cannot commit future 
congressional appropriations by authorizing funds for a long-term project without 
providing all/most of the funds in the year of authorization.  Budget scoring dramatically 
changed the MFH landscape.  
1. Budget Scoring Defined 
The process of scoring or “scorekeeping” determines whether the total cost of a 
long-term program (or how much of the total cost) is char ged against the Federal budget 
in the program’s first year, or whether those program costs are spread out over the life of 
the program.  Scoring/scorekeeping is the percentage of dollar value, from 0% to 100%, 
of a project’s cost that must be allocated to an agency’s budget in a given fiscal year.  
Therefore, if a project cost of $1 million is scored at 10%, then $100,000 of the agency’s 
budget authority for that year must be used to cover the assessment.  The remaining 
$900,000 is applied to future years’ budgets, based on the scoring for each years’ 
commitments.  A score of 100% would mean that all $1 million would have to be 
covered by the agency’s budget authority in the designated year, even if the contract 
called for actual payments of $50,000 per year , for 20 years.  (Else, 2001)  
Budget impact of the use of various authorities ranges from none, through 
moderate to high.  Examples include; 
· Zero Budget Score:  conveyance of non-revenue producing land or 
existing housing units to private developers, or payment of rents by 
disbursing allotments 
· 4-7% budget score:  provision of a loan guarantee.  
· 30-40% budget score:  direct loan to a contractor  
· 70-100% budget score:  guaranteeing a minimum tenant occupancy rate or 
the net present value of all annual BAH for the total number of tenants  
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2. Budget Scoring Effects on Military Family Housing Programs  
In the early 1990’s, section 801/802 programs became caught up in the much 
larger political battle over the Federal budget deficit and Federal spending.  The BEA 
was  clear regarding the treatment of leases, lease-purchases and purchases.  It stated that, 
“Budget authority will be scored in the year in which budget authority is first made 
available in the amount of the government’s total estimated legal obligation.”   
Prior to 1990, OMB scored the Section 801 and 802 programs, somewhat 
reluctantly, on a yearly basis across the life of the lease.  Under the new law, the full cost 
of the 20- or 25-year lease would be scored in the first year, rather than applying the 
yearly leases obligations against the budget year in which they were paid.  DoD 
complained bitterly to Congress and OMB, but received little sympathy.  One creative 
suggestion to circumvent the budget scoring problems was to make 801 deals into “1 -
year contrac ts, with up to twenty-four one-year options, which could be terminated at any 
time without cost to the Government.”  This solution was labeled “unworkable” and not 
attempted, since private firms would not economically finance projects without long -term 
Government commitments  (Baldwin, 1996). 
The new scoring rules took effect on 01 October 1991, and DoD announced that, 
due to budget scoring, it would no longer seek 801/802 authorizations.  The BEA and its 
scoring method eliminated one of the most attractive features of the 801/802 programs, 
smaller yearly expenditures, and made construction with appropriated funds preferable, 
which resulted in clear title to the housing at the project’s conclusion.  The Army 
obtained the lion’s share of 801/802 housing, adding over 4000 units to its MFH 
inventory.  While the 801/802 programs did not solve the MFH problem, they contributed 
to its solution, or at the very least, prevented its worsening.  (Baldwin, 1996)  
F. ELIGIBILITY 
Eligibility refers to who is deemed qualified and deserving to live in MFH.  
Before 1949, marriage among the enlisted ranks was discouraged and reinforced by 
housing policy.  Enlisted soldiers were assigned to barracks and paid for separate quarters 
out of their own pockets if they wished to bring their spouses/children with them to their 
duty stations.  (Alt, 1991)  
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Including junior enlisted personnel with families in the housing allowance system, 
like their inclusion in the system of DoD family housing, is relatively recent.  The Career 
Compensation Act of 1949 marked the first time that most grades of enlisted personnel 
became eligible for cash housing allowances similar to those that officers received, but 
only at “without dependants” rates.  Marriage among junior enlisted personnel was 
strongly discouraged.  The 1949 act also made married “career” enlisted personnel 
(defined as corporals with seven years of service and all sergeants) eligible for public 
quarters, believing housing allowance “with dependants” was unnecessary since 
government housing program expansions would soon fill the need.  Enlisted personnel 
struggled to meet housing needs throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  Although some 
additional allowances were available for special dependency cases, advent of the all -
volunteer force (AVF) in 1973 finally established housing allowance “with-dependant” 
rates for junior enlisted personnel.  (CBO, 1993)  
After 1973, all junior enlisted personnel with dependants became eligible for 
housing allowance, but not all were eligible for on-base government quarters.  MFH was 
still restricted and described by Congress in 1983 as available to those personnel who “in 
all likelihood are committed to a career in the military.”  Specifically, the minimum rank 
was set at “E4 with over 2 years of service, except when all eligible personnel are 
otherwise adequately housed.”  (Baldwin, 1996) 
Because of congressional involvement in the section 801/802 programs, DoD 
gradually made all married enlisted personnel eligible for MFH.  Today, MFH for 
married junior enlisted personnel is seen as a valuable tool to encourage favorable first 
term retention decisions, to promote military family members’ overall well -being, and to 
increase deployment readiness.  
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
While the Federal Government’s housing policies regar ding military families 
changed significantly over the last 200 years, one condition has pervaded the landscape.  
The supply of housing units available to military families has consistently lagged the 
demand for these units.  As well, the questionable quality and low affordability of these 
structures led to additional hardships and sacrifices by service members and their 
families.  Although Congress and the Defense Department have applied significant effort 
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to eliminating the problem over the last 50 years, military family housing shortages and 
inadequacy issues still permeate military service today.  
A comparison of the four most prominent privatization programs of the post -
World War II era reveals two broad tendencies:  a tendency to separate the cost of the 
housing from the service members’ ability to pay; and a tendency to separate construction 
from operations and maintenance.  All four privatization programs are progeny of the 
Cold War, two of them from its beginning and two from its end.  All were born of  the 
conviction that private enterprise could be mobilized in peacetime to support that war 
effort.  All are tangible reminders of the unprecedented importance that military families 
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III. TRADITIONAL MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Today, DoD provides housing for its military families through a three-pillared 
approach; housing allowances (BAH), traditional MILCON and the new Military 
Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI).  This chapter discusses the BAH and MILCON 
pillars, with MHPI deferred to Chapter IV.  The relative aggregate cost, and the 
components of those costs, for both BAH and MILCON housing is considered.  Mil itary 
personnel demographic shifts, personal preferences and the reasons for those preferences 
are reviewed to determine what method for providing family housing may most closely 
align with service members current and anticipated wants and needs.  Finally,  problems 
and short falls of the BAH and MILCON methods are examined.   
B. MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING TODAY, AND ITS IMPACT ON 
SERVICE MEMBERS 
Excluding the new privatization initiatives, the Defense Department’s Military 
Family Housing program consists of tw o components, housing allowances and DoD 
owned housing units.  These two components are discussed below.  The reasons that 
military families choose to live in MFH, or the reasons they choose not to, are also 
outlined, providing an overview of the current demand for MFH.  
1. Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH)  
As discussed in Chapter II, the Defense Department traditionally gives housing 
allowances to certain service members when on-base military family housing is not 
available.  Service members then exercise their own discretion in purchasing or renting 
accommodations, in the surrounding community, that fit their budget and needs.  BAH is 
funded through the annual Military Personnel (MILPERS) appropriation.  
a. History and Purpose of Housing Allowances 
In 1949, the Career Compensation Act established the Basic Allowance 
for Quarters (BAQ) as a permanent fixture in the military compensation system.  While 
the eligibility criteria to receive BAQ changed over the years, the system’s premise has 
not changed.  Recognizing its inability to provide MFH to all who qualified for it, DoD 
instituted BAQ as the formal solution to the MFH gap.  Congress authorized variable 
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housing allowance (VHA) in 1980 as a rental supplement for high cost -of-living areas.  
VHA improved the housing allowance system, but problems and complaints persisted.   
At the Defense Department’s request, Congress overhauled the housing 
allowance system, re-labeling it Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) and instituting the 
new system in fiscal year 1998.  DoD and the service components designed the Basic 
Allowance for Housing program to provide more accurate housing allowances by basing 
them on the market price of rental housing (rather than member -reported rents).  This 
new method ensured a better correlation between allowance payments and rental prices.   
The purpose of the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) program is to 
provide uniformed service members accurate and equitable housing compensation, based 
on housing costs in the local civilian housing market s near installations, and is payable 
when government quarters are not provided or available.  Since the goal is to help 
members cover the costs of housing in the private sector, rental-housing costs in the 
private sector are the basis for the allowance.  DoD determines the correct housing 
allowance to enable members to afford suitable rental housing within a reasonable 
distance of their duty location.  For BAH purposes, “reasonable commuting distance” is 
defined as generally within 20 miles or one hour driv e with rush hour traffic.  The 
allowance amount is based on geographic duty location (by installation zip code), service 
member pay grade, and dependent status.  (BAH Primer, 2002)  
b. BAH Data Collection and Rate Setting 
DoD employs a private contractor to collect the data annually for 
approximately 400 Military Housing Areas (MHA) in the United States, including Alaska 
and Hawaii.  DoD and the Services define these MHAs by sets of ZIP Codes.  Data 
collection occurs in the spring and summer when housing mar kets are most active.  
Rental costs are collected on apartments, townhouses/duplexes, and single -family rental 
units of varying bedroom sizes.  Price data collected includes the cost of rental housing, 
utilities, and renter’s insurance.  In each MHA, the contractor contacts the major local 
utility provider and collects their service fees and utility rate data.  They gather data rate 
information for both the current season and the most extreme heating and cooling seasons 
for each MHA, as well as scheduled rate increases.  The renter’s insurance portion of 
BAH covers the value of household contents.  These content values are correlated with 
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selected incomes and dwelling types.  (BAH Primer, 2002)  This data set, along with 
DoD policy guidance regarding target Out-Of-Pocket expenses percentage, forms the 
basis for determining BAH rates, which are readjusted annually.  
c. Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Expenses 
BAH is designed to be fair for all service members in all locations in the 
United States.  Although housing costs and BAH rates vary by location, average out -of-
pocket costs are designed to be the same for members of the same rank with typical rental 
expenses.  The typical service member in a given grade and dependent status who arrives 
at a new duty station will have the same monthly out-of-pocket costs regardless of the 
location.  For example, if the out-of-pocket cost for a typical E-5 with dependents is 
$106, the typical (median) E-5 with dependents can expect to pay $106 out-of-pocket for 
housing if assigned to Miami, New York, San Diego, or any duty location in the United 
States.  (BAH Primer, 2002) 
However, for a given individual, the actual out-of-pocket expense may be 
higher or lower than the typical.  For example, a service member who chooses a bigger or 
more costly home than the median will spend more out-of-pocket.  The opposite is true if 
a service member chooses to occupy a smaller or less costly home.  Only for the member 
with median costs do we say that out-of-pocket expense is the same for a given pay grade 
and dependent status in any given location.  (BAH Primer, 2002)  
In his fiscal year 2002 Management Agenda, published by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), President Bush proclaimed, “The Administration is 
committed to reducing to zero by 2005, the average out-of-pocket expense of military 
families living in private housing in local communities.  This will enable more military 
families to leave inadequate government housing and rent quality private -sector housing 
in the local communities around DoD’s installations.”  (President’s Management Agenda, 
2002)  OOP expenses peaked at 22% of total housing costs prior to instituting the BAH 
system.  The planned OOP expense ratios are 15% for FY-01, 11.3% for FY-02, 7.5% for 
FY-03, 3.5% for FY-04 and zero by FY-05.  (BAH Primer, 2002) 
2. Service Member Housing Preferences 
In 1999, DoD and GAO jointly conducted a survey of active duty personnel to 
gather their views on MFH, housing allowances, and a variety of other issues.  The 
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survey indicates that personnel tend to prefer civilian housing when they have the 
financial ability to afford it.  The survey solicited 66,000 personnel, of which 51% 
responded.  At the time, 33% of personnel with dependants lived in MFH and 67% lived 
in civilian housing.  If costs were equal, 72% of service members responding indicated 
they prefer civilian housing.  Officers are more likely to live in civilian housing than 
enlisted personnel.  Also, personnel are more likely to live in civilian housing as they 
gain seniority; 75% with over 20 years in service living in civilian housing.  Home 
ownership also increases dramatically with years of service, while renting decreases.  
Only 14% of personnel with less than five years service own homes.  The service-wide 
average is 30% for home ownership.  Fifty-three percent of personnel with over 20 years 
service own their homes.  (GAO-01-684) 
3. Those Who Favor MFH and Why 
Many military families strongly favor DoD owned/sponsored housing for a 
variety of reasons, including economic, security and convenience.  MFH units are either 
constructed on, or in close proximity to their parent installations, and form unique 
subcultures of close communities with exclusively military families.  Depending upon the 
installation, waiting lists to obtain MFH range from non-existent to 24 months, but over -
all the demand for MFH far outstrips its supply.  (RAND, 1999)  
When surveyed, service members give a variety of reasons why they prefer MFH 
for their families.  Those who prefer MFH list a variety of reasons for  their choices, 
including close proximity to base facilities such as child care, playgrounds, hobby shops, 
exchanges/commissary/shopping, fitness centers, youth centers, health clinics, and 
numerous outdoor recreation facilities.  DoD provides many of thes e facilities at below-
market costs, making them attractive options and increasing the importance of their close 
proximity to service members’ living quarters.  Some MFH residents simply prefer to live 
in and around communities filled with other people like themselves who understand the 
rootless lifestyles and spousal deployments of military service.  (Johnson, 2002)  
A recent RAND study quantified the top nine reasons service members give for 
preferring MFH, and their associated percentage of respondents ans wering. 
· MFH is the best economic decision 61.1% 
· MFH provides the best security 27.5% 
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· MFH has close proximity to work 25.5% 
· MFH was available when needed 22.7% 
· Did not like the civilian housing available and affordable  12.7% 
· Like the military housing that was offered 8.9% 
· Close proximity to base facilities such as commissary/exchange 7.8% 
· On-base schools are better than off-base schools 4.2% 
· Like having military neighbors 2.2% 
The report also indicated that demographic characteristics are the main factor in 
the demand for MFH.  Those who most strongly prefer MFH are lower income personnel 
(especially junior enlisted personnel), those with spouses that do not work outside the 
home, and those with a greater number of children.  While non-working spouses and 
junior pay grades tend to make less money available for housing expenditures, more 
children tend to require larger (in terms of square feet) dwellings, requiring larger 
expenditures.  Since BAH rates increase by pay grade, not number of dependants, 
military members with larger families are entitled to a larger residence in military 
housing than they would likely be able to afford in the civilian housing market.  Clearly, 
service members living in MFH do so because it is affordable, secure and close to work.  
(RAND, 1999) 
4. Those Who Avoid MFH and Why 
While some military families wait up to two years for on-base housing, most 
military families (about 2/3) continue living off base, in privately owned or rented 
accommodations.  The reasons for their decisions to reside off base vary, but include 
small, run-down or non-available MFH, rank-segregation, busybody syndrome and the 
numerous rules/regulations governing MFH.  Some simply do not want to be surrounded 
by military culture 24 hours per day.  (Johnson, 2002) 
Dual-military couples primarily live off-post for economic reasons, with the 
exception of select senior-ranking command positions where service members are 
generally expected to live on base, in “commander’s residences.”  Both service members 
receive BAH at the without-dependants rate, unless they have one or more non-military 
dependants, in which case, the senior-ranking person of the couple receives BAH at the 
with-dependants rate.  Since their combined BAH is substantially more than the cost of 
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renting or owning in the civilian market, dual-military couples rarely live in MFH.  
(RAND, 1999) 
The 1999 RAND study also cites the top nine reasons service members give for 
renting or owning housing off base, and the associated percentage of respondents 
answering. 
· Renters 
· MFH not available when needed 40.2% 
· Prefer freedom from MFH rules/regulations  35.9% 
· Prefer privacy afforded by blending into  
civilian community 31.0% 
· Did not like MFH offered/available  15.7% 
· Renting is a better economic decision 11.0% 
· Spouse is military, so MFH would be more costly 6.5% 
· Thought off-base schools are better than on-base schools 6.0% 
· Like having civilian neighbors 5.6% 
· Better security living in civilian housing2.6%  
· Owners 
· Good investment and tax advantages  40.5% 
· Owning is a better ec onomic decision 30.0% 
· Prefer freedom from MFH rules/regulations  23.2% 
· MFH unavailable when needed 16.9% 
· Prefer privacy afforded by blending into civilian  
community 16.5% 
· Expect to live in this area when I leave the military 13.3% 
· Did not like MFH offered/available  12.4% 
· Liked the ability to change my condo/house 10.6% 
· Thought off-base schools are better than on-base schools 9.5% 
Similar to their on base counterparts, military families residing off base 
demonstrate strong recurring patterns to their housing choices, including economic 
considerations.  Those who rent private sector housing do so because MFH is either not 
available or substandard when they need it, and choose to avoid the hassle and expense of 
moving when MFH does become available.  They also prefer the freedom and anonymity 
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of civilian community living.  Military families who purchase homes do so primarily for 
economic reasons, seeing home ownership as a long-term financial commitment.  Like 
renters, owners also prefer the freedom and anonymit y of civilian communities, and cite 
MFH as unavailable or substandard when they need it.  
5. Personnel Demographics and Its Impact on MFH 
The demographics of the armed forces are shifting along three avenues affecting 
MFH.  Some shifts mirror trends in the population at large, but others run counter to 
them.  First, the average service member is two years older than in 1973, a trend leading 
to more families for any organization.  This age/family increase is even more prevalent in 
the military, since service members tend to marry sooner than their civilian counterparts, 
and have children before age 25.  The proportion of married men (age 20 -24) in the 
military is almost 50%, as opposed to 20% outside the military.  The proportion of 
married women (age 20-24) in the military is 50%, as opposed to 37% outside the 
military.  (RAND, 1997)  
Second, today’s service member is more likely to be female.  Women made up 
just 5% of all recruits in 1973, increasing to 15% in 1994.  This proportion continues to 
rise as more military jobs, previously considered close combat duties, become available 
to women.  Females are more likely to be single parents, accounting for 25% of the 
female service members.  Male single parents are rare.  Most installations give MFH 
priority to single parents.  (RAND, 1997)  
Third, more military spouses are working outside the home.  In 1992, almost 50% 
of the military spouses with children under age five were working, and 55% with children 
between six and seventeen were working.  While working spous es increase installation 
child-care facility demand, they also increase family financial resources, which tends to 
negate the economic advantage of MFH, decreasing its demand.  (RAND, 1997)  
6. MFH Utilities 
Guidance from OMB states that it is Government policy to minimize energy 
consumption.  Consumption has been found to decrease when occupants of Government 
rental quarters are required to pay for the actual cost of utilities used (such as electricity, 
oil, natural gas, propane, water and sewer).  Utilitie s should be furnished by a private 
company and billed directly to the occupant, wherever possible.  (OMB, A-45, 1993) 
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When Government furnished utilities are provided, they should be metered or 
measured, where practicable.  The rate for utilities furnished  by the Government will be 
the same as the residential rate for these utilities in the nearest established community 
(when the appraisal method is used) or survey area (when the survey method is used) 
used in determining the base rental rate.  The consumed amount of Government furnished 
utilities that are individually metered or measured will be determined by actual readings.  
(OMB, A-45, 1993) 
When Government furnished utilities are not individually metered or measured, 
consumption will be determined on the basis of an analysis of the average amounts of 
utilities used in comparable private rental housing in the nearest established community 
(when the appraisal method is used) or survey area (when the survey method is used).  
Such estimates are usually available from local utility companies.  (OMB, A-45, 1993) 
Despite this guidance, most service members living in MFH are not accountable 
for their own utility usage.  Most MFH units do not even have metering devices to 
measure individual unit consumption of ele ctricity, gas, water, etc.  In 1993, utility costs 
accounted for about 30% of DoD’s expenditures for operating and maintaining MFH, 
contributing to the MFH cost differential.  Unlike most families who live in the private 
sector, families living in MFH do not pay for utility services and have no direct financial 
incentive to economize.  (CBO, 1993)  
7. School Impact Aid 
School impact aid fees are paid by the Federal Government to the local 
educational agency (public school system) to compensate it for the imp act of military 
dependant students on the school system because installations are exempt from paying 
local real estate property taxes, which provide most of the funding for public schools.  
Impact aid payments are classified as ‘high’ or ‘low.’  High-level impact aid is provided 
when service members’ children who live in an on-base project attend off-base public 
schools.  Low -level impact aid is provided when the service members’ children who live 
in an on-base project go to military schools (on-base) or if service members’ children 
who live in an off-base project go to public schools.  (PEP Glossary, 2000)   
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The differential between high impact and low impact school aid situations 
significantly adds to the cost of MFH located on installations.  Although the  values cited 
vary from study to study, CBO (1993), GAO (1996) and CNA (1997) indicate that 40 to 
50% of the on-base cost differential of traditional MFH was due to high-level school 
impact aid.  The 1994 OSD study found that high-level impact aid accounted for the 
entire cost differential for on-base MFH.  (GAO-96-203) 
8. The Installation Housing Office  
Most military installations operate family housing offices, responsible for 
managing the installation’s family housing program.  They are usually staffed by DoD 
civilian employees, or occasionally staffed by non-DoD workers through outsourcing 
contracts.  The family housing offices perform or oversee several functions, including: 
· Managing assignment, termination and utilization of the MFH stock 
· Acquire and dispose of MFH assets 
· Manage MFH leasing programs  
· Conduct pre-inspections and termination inspections  
· Initiate and monitor MFH maintenance and repairs 
· Conduct housing market analysis  
· Justify MFH deficits 
· Provide self-help instructions to residents 
· Manage home-finding, relocation and referral services  (Army Family 
Housing, 1995) 
Most of these functions concern direct management of the installation’s current 
and future MFH stock.  The last function provides services to newly arrived military 
families when on-base MFH is not immediately available to them.  Referral offices 
provide access to personal advice and written materials regarding the local housing 
market and economy, including average rental and purchase prices, utility charges, crime 
statistics, schools, and ‘prohibited’ areas and establishments.  This information is 
especially valuable since the housing office is one of the first places service members are 
recommended to visit upon arrival at a new duty station, and because most arriving 




9. MFH Programs Paid by MILCON and O&M Funds  
Congress maintains significant visibility and control over funds that support 
traditional MFH.  The yearly National Defense Authorization Act appropriates specific 
funds for each service component, for both family housing MILCON and family housing 
O&M.  This MFH support funding is strictly separated from other MILCON and O&M 
funds, and must be requested for specific projects and specific installations.  MILCON 
funds are sub-divided by new construction and major renovation projects.  O&M funds 
are sub-divided into several categories, including operations, utilities, maintenance, 
interest payments, mortgage insurance, currency fluctuations, and reimbursements.  
MILCON funds remain available for obligation for five years after appropriation, while 
O&M funds must be obligated in the year for which they are appropriated.  Service 
components and installations have no freedom to redirect MFH funds to better meet their 
needs.  Once appropriated by Congress, the funds must be used for that specific purpose 
for which they were appropriated and that purpose only.  The DoD Financial 
Management Regulation, volume 6, chapter 9 summarizes  the control Congress exercises 
over MFH funds, stating that, “Congress established the family housing appropriation to 
separate the funding of family housing from other programs.  All obligations incurred to 
support the military family housing program shall be charged to the family housing 
appropriation.” 
C. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORTS MFH 
Despite the historical and persistent problems and shortfalls with MFH provided 
through congressional appropriations, DoD still supports the continuing need for a robust 
MFH inventory.   
1. MFH is Part of the Total Compensation Package  
When viewed as an in-kind transfer, MFH is another avenue for DoD to 
compensate its service members outside the bounds of the traditional base pay system to 
help attract and maintain  a high quality all volunteer force.  This may also explain why 




2. Intangible Quality of Life Factors  
Intangible factors also contribute to the favor with which many senior military 
leaders view DoD’s role in providing family housing.  Such leaders are familiar with the 
tradition of closed military communities, especially among the officer corps.  Many 
believe that the on-base lifestyle reinforces service members’ military commitment.  In 
their eyes, a military career is not merely a job in the civilian sense, but an entire way of 
life.  Separate military communities that reflect this viewpoint promote long -term 
military vibrancy and stability.  (CBO, 1993)  Senior leaders also cite increased unit 
cohesion, acculturation of junior personnel and facilitating support of deployed service 
members’ families as important reasons favoring more MFH.  (RAND, 1999)  
Many DoD leaders frequently advertise MFH as contribut ing to over-all quality of 
military life, making service members and their families more satisfied with military 
lifestyle, more likely to choose careers, and subsequently easing the services’ retention 
and recruitment burdens.  In response to a 1996 GAO report that was critical of DoD’s 
MFH programs, John B. Goodman, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Industrial 
Affairs and Installations wrote,  
An iron link exists between quality housing and readiness.  Military 
readiness is dependant upon retaining a s killed, trained force, and retention 
is directly affected by quality of life.  An important aspect of quality of 
life is quality housing.  Separation of military members from their families 
for deployments, operational missions and training is a long-standing fact 
of military life.  As DoD’s worldwide obligations fail to shrink and 
deployments grow, so grows the military community support needs of 
separated military families.  That support is characterized by a community 
that is safe, secure, and has the necessary community support facilities to 
accommodate families while providing the cohesiveness needed during 
family separations.  Recent operations highlight the increased frequency of 
deployments which have resulted in military members being separated 
from their families more often and for longer timeframes.  This increased 
frequency of deployments results in a greater need for the remaining 
families to be located close to military installation support services.  
Despite DoD and the service components’ staunch support for MFH and its 
contribution to quality of life, little or no quantitative evidence to support these claims is 
visible through multiple quality of life and exit surveys.  (GAO, 96 -203)  Today, 
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vehement support for sustaining and expanding installation supported MFH continues 
among DoD leadership, both civilian and uniformed.  
D. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT MFH SYSTEM 
While most agree that MFH performs an important function for DoD, most also 
agree that the system has its problems and shortcomings as well.  The following table, 
from a 1999 RAND study, displays data indicating service families’ housing conditions.  
 
 Civilian Owner  
Characteristic MFH Rental Occupied 
Dwelling Age (years) 31 20 15 
Dwelling Size (square feet) 1,257 1,336 1,728 
Over-all Good House Condition  65% 79% 95% 
Serious Pest Problem 23%   8% 6% 
Good School Quality 26% 29% 49% 
OOP Expenses ($ per month) zero $167 $356 
Nearby Playground (%) 94% 59% 61% 
10-minute Work Commute 58% 21% 9% 
30-minute Work Commute 97% 85% 77% 
Table 2. Service Families’ Housing Conditions. 
 
1. Substandard Conditions  
As the chart above depicts, when measured by almost any standard, the average 
MFH unit is less desirable than its private sector counterpart.  Although they are 
economically rational, close to work, and child -friendly with playgrounds nearby, MFH 
units are also older, smaller, in poorer condition, and have a higher likelihood of pest 
problems and lower school quality.  Additionally, many of the MFH units built before 
1978 still contain asbestos insulation, lead water pipes and lead-based paints, making 
long term occupation of MFH units potentially dangerous to military families.  
2. Long Waiting Lists  
When demand for MFH exceeds its supply (usually the case), installation housing 
offices maintain waiting lists to prioritize allocation of the limited MFH stock.  Separate 
waiting lists are maintained, usually according to rank, but sometimes according to 
family size.  In rare circumstances, service members are moved to the top of the list 
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because of military necessity (many senior commanders are required to live on-base), 
extreme financial distress, or severe medical conditions that may require immediate 
access to base medical facilities.  Most installations also give MFH priority to single 
parents.  The waiting time varies widely by installation, and ranges from one month to 
18-24 months.  (RAND, 1999) 
In general, waiting lists are longest for junior enlisted and junior officer personnel 
for two reasons.  They are lower on the pay scale, in terms of both BAH and base pay, 
making them unable to afford home ownership and least capable of sustaining significant 
ongoing OOP expenses.  Also, as a residual effect of the pre-1980s policy of 
discouraging marriage among first -term enlistees and limiting MFH to ‘career minded’ 
personnel, installations tend to have proportionately fewer quarters available, especially 
for the junior (E1-E4) enlisted.  Lastly, installations located in areas with high private 
sector housing costs tend to have longer-than-average waiting lists for all rank groupings 
and dwelling sizes.  (CBO, 1993) 
3. MFH Costs DoD More Than Private-Sector Housing 
Within the last ten years, several studies examined the relative costs of on -base 
MFH provided through the installation commander, as compared to housing provided 
through the private sector obtained from the local economy.  The studies were interior 
and exterior to DoD, including the Congressional Budget Office (1993), OSD (1994), 
General Accounting Office (1996), and Center for Naval Analysis (1997).  Althoug h the 
studies varied in their computations and percentage differentials, all studies concluded 
that on-base MFH is more costly than private sector housing provided to service 
members through housing allowances.  The most comprehensive and frequently cited 
study is the CBO study, which computed the average annual long-term costs for 







Cost Component     DoD-MFH Private Sector 
Operations and Maintenance   $ 6,200 
Amortized Cost of Capital      4,400 
School Impact Aid       1,900 
Cost of Land           500 
Housing Allowance (BAQ/VHA)     $ 7,500 
Service Member Out-Of-Pocket Contribution      1,700 
Total Annual Cost (1993 dollars)   $ 13,000 $ 9,200 
 
Table 3. Average Annual Long-Term Costs for Comparable Housing Units. 
 
This data indicates that, in aggregate, MFH is 41% more costly than its 
comparable private sector counterpart (9200 x 1.41 = 13000).  DoD’s BAH initiative to 
eliminate OOP expenses by 2005 will make DoD responsible for the $1,700 currently 
paid by the service member.  Although DoD’s proportion of the total cost will change, 
the comparative, aggregate costs will not change.  Operations and maintenance includes 
utilities, minor repairs, and local housing management operations.  Cost of capital is 
based on a 57-year service life, including construction costs and one major renovation.  
School impact aid is the difference between what DoD pays for students who reside on 
base but attend off base schools, and the increment paid for students who both live and 
attend school off base.  Cost of land is an opportunity cost (3% of $16,000 per MFH unit) 
of the Federal government owning land, but borrowing money to pay for it.  The $9,200 
total cost of private sector housing includes all associated costs including real estate 
taxes, maintenance, utilities, land, depreciation and interest.  (CBO, 1993)  
The 1997 CNA survey of all enlisted sailors found Navy MFH to be 49% more 
costly than its private sector counterpart.  It determined total MFH costs of $15,100 per 
year and comparable private sector housing costs of just $10,125.  Of the $10,125, the 
Navy paid $8,100 in BAQ/VHA and the average enlisted sailor paid $2,025 (20%) out -
of-pocket.  Using the same methodology, the CNA study found Marine Corps MFH 30% 
more costly than equivalent private sector quarters.  (CNA, 1997) 
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Based in 1995 data, GAO also found that MFH is more costly than private sector 
housing, by about 33%.  The report cited excessive school impact aid and Government 
inefficiencies (caused by long planning and budgeting lead times, project oversight, high 
labor costs, detailed regulations and constraints) as the two reasons for the cost 
differential.  Not surprisingly, the 1994 OSD study found MFH to be only 13% more 
costly than private sector housing.  (GAO -96-203) 
In 1995, DoD spent $4.4 billion in housing allowances for 605,000 military 
families, covering about 80% of service members’ housing costs.  That same year, DoD 
spent $2.8 billion to lease, operate and maintain 293,000 MFH units and $724 million 
(MILCON) to cons truct and renovate MFH units.  (GAO, 96-203)  Since then, the 
numbers have changed slightly, reflecting a smaller active duty force and a commitment 
to lower/reduce OOP expenses, but BAH still received a disproportionately small 
proportion of the total housing dollars whereas the on-base MILCON/O&M accounts 
received a higher proportion of the housing dollars.  In 2000, DoD spent about $750 
million (MILCON), from appropriated MFH funds, to replace or renovate MFH units, 
and $2.8 billion, from the services’ MFH O&M funds, to lease, operate and maintain the 
existing MFH stock.  BAH payments totaled $5.2 billion.  (BAH Primer, 2002)   
The numbers for 1995 and 2000 demonstrate DoD’s continued but declining skew 
towards on-base housing.  In 1995, BAH accounted for  55% of the housing dollars, while 
accounting for 65% of the personnel.  On-base housing, supported by MILCON/O&M 
funds, received 45% of the funding to support only 35% of the service members.  In 
2000, BAH accounted for 60% and MILCON/O&M consumed 40% of the housing 
dollars while the ratio of on-base to off-base personnel remained unchanged.  DoD still 
spends disproportionately more money to house service members on installations than it 
spends for off-post housing allowances.  
4. Unavailability of Private Sector Housing 
BAH cannot provide adequate, affordable family housing at all locations.  Private 
sector family housing is not available, at any price, is of extremely poor condition, or 
may be located outside practical commuting distance near many military  installations.  
Bases located in geographically remote areas with little or no local civilian population or 
housing market, such as Fort Irwin, CA, simply may not have private sector housing units 
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available to rent or buy.  Service families assigned to bases located in extremely 
constricted real estate markets, such as Monterey, CA, may find that units near the 
installation are prohibitively expensive, and more reasonably priced units are outside the 
standard commuting distance.  Still other housing units may be close-by, available and 
reasonably priced, but be of such poor quality as to make them unattractive to military 
families.  Although BAH accounts for approximately two-thirds of military family 
housing, it cannot provide adequate, affordable housing under all circumstances.  
E.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the history and current state of military family housing 
provided through both the BAH and MILCON funding methods.  BAH is the lowest cost 
housing method, is highly flexible and immediately responsive to the changing needs of 
DoD, and allows service members unlimited choice in obtaining housing within the local 
private sector housing market.  However, private sector housing is not always available in 
sufficient quantity near the installation, is sometimes prohibitively expensive, or may be 
in poor condition.  Studies indicate most service members prefer off base housing, but 
significant numbers still choose on base housing due to its substantial economic benefit 
of being less costly than an of f base counterpart.  Service members’ changing 
demographics have lead to a need for more MFH on and around military installations.  
Over the last 50 years, housing supply, funded through MILCON appropriations has not 
kept pace with housing demand, leading to a chronic shortage of adequate, affordable 
housing for military families.  Chapter IV presents the Military Housing Privatization 
Initiative (MHPI) as possible solution to this chronic MFH shortage.  
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IV. MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE: 
(MHPI) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) from 
legislation, through growing pains, and progression to its current status.  It describes 
twelve privatization authorities, the basic MHPI process, how it is fun ded, reporting 
requirements, and several policies that significantly affect the structure of MHPI 
agreements.  Finally, the chapter offers a basic overview of the Air Force, Army and 
Navy MFH circumstances and their distinct approaches to using the MHPI au thorities to 
improve their MFH inventories. 
B. 1996 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT AND MI LITARY HOUSING 
PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE (MHPI) 
In 1996, Congress and DoD tried something very different from the traditional 
MILCON approach and different from the old Wherry and Capehart programs.  The 
Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) was devised to give the Department of 
Defense the ability to entice private investment by encouraging it to act more like a 
private enterprise.  Just as businesses can be creat ive and take advantage of local real 
estate market conditions in customizing development projects, the MHPI was designed to 
give similar flexibility to DoD.  This was intended as a step away from the perceived 
one-size-fits-all mentality of the earlier programs.  (Else, 2001) 
1. Background and Three Years of OSD Leadership 
Section 2801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 1996 (Public Law 
104-106) created the MHPI as a five-year pilot program, within a 10-year plan to resolve 
the general military housing problem.  Using its “alternative authorizations,” Congress 
intended to improve military housing quickly and economically by leveraging the Federal 
investment by encouraging private investment.  Originally, the MHPI was centralized 
within DoD under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  Because of the 
complexity inherent in this new approach to military housing construction, the 
unfamiliarity of DoD contracting personnel with these kinds of negotiations, and new 
legal, financial, and budget is sues that appeared as the program got underway, progress in 
the negotiation of contracts and in beginning construction was notably slower than 
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originally envisioned.  The first project award, known as NAS Corpus Christi/Kingsville -
I (Texas) for 404 units, was consummated in July of 1996.  The second, termed Everett-I 
(Washington) and encompassing 185 housing units, was awarded in March of 1997.  In 
August 1998, a third contract was awarded for 420 units at Lackland Air Force Base, 
Texas.  (Else, 2001) 
These slow-paced experiences contributed to a 1997 decision by DoD to extend 
its original MFH solution target date of 2006, by four years, to 2010.  In addition, a 1998 
GAO report faulted the cost analysis methodology used by DOD, indicating that actual 
savings would be considerably less than the Services claimed, and suggested that more 
effective use could be made of existing private market housing near military installations.  
By the end of August 1998, more than three years into the five -year program, only three 
projects had been awarded contracts.  (Else, 2001)  
In October of 1998, the Secretary of Defense devolved operational responsibility 
for MHPI to the individual Services, with oversight and final approval authority vested in 
the Housing Revitalization Support Office (HRSO), under the OSD Office of 
Competitive Sourcing and Privatization.  Between the Lackland award and the approach 
of the end of the initial MHPI authorization in late 2000, only one additional project, Fort 
Carson, Colorado, for 2,663 units, was finalized.  A follow-up GAO report released in 
March of 2000 concluded that, because none of the contracted projects had yet been 
brought into full operation, there was little empirical data by which to assess whether the 
MHPI would achieve its goal of eliminating inadequate military housing more 
economically and faster than possible through the use of traditional construction 
practices.  (Else, 2001) 
Congressional concern with a perceived lack of results became apparent as MHPI 
expiration approached in February 2001.  However, the Military Construction 
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2001 (Public Law 106-246) extended the MHPI until 
31 December 2004.  With the MHPI pace increasing, the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-107) subsequently extended its term to 31 December 2012, 
allowing enough time for DoD to complete its MFH privatization program.  
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The 1994 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 103-337, Section 2803) 
provided a Navy-only pilot program of special authorities to allow the formation of 
limited partnerships with private developers for the purpose of improving MFH.  The 
Public -Private Ventures (PPV) were precursors to the 1996 authorizations and served to 
pave the way for the DoD-wide MHPI.  The Navy initiated solicitations for its first two 
PPV projects (Everett-I and Kingsville-I) under this law but actually awarded them under 
the broader MHPI.  Provisions of the 1994 law were fully absorbed into the MHPI 
authorized in 1996. 
2. The 12 Alternative Authorizations, or MHPI “Toolbox” 
The MHPI includes twelve separate authorities that revive some of the provisions 
of the earlier construction programs and add to them, while permitting their selective use 
where they can be most advantageous.  These alternative authorization s are listed in 
descending order from lowest budget impact to highest budget impact.  (See Appendix A 
for the complete definitions of these alternate authorizations from the 1996 Defense 
Authorization Act, Public Law 104-106.)  Note that Section 2872, General Authority, 
specifies that these twelve authorities apply only to, “family housing units on or near 
military installations within the United States and its territories and possessions.”  The 
MHPI authorities do not apply to installations located in foreign nations. 
· Conveyance of Real Property:  The Government may transfer title of 
Federal property to private ownership  
· Unit Size and Type:  Builders are allowed to construct housing in 
accordance with local building codes, without rank-specific space 
restrictions 
· Inclusion of Ancillary Support Facilities:   Bids for contracts may 
incorporate additional amenities such as child care centers and dining 
facilities, to enhance the attractiveness of the basic housing 
· Payment of Rent by Allotment:   Landlords may receive payment of rents 
through automatic electronic fund transfer from the appropriate Federal 
disbursing facility, guaranteeing cash flow  
· Loan Guarantee:  The Government may guarantee up to 80% of the 
private sector loans arranged by the property developer  
· Direct Loan:  The Government may make a loan directly to a contractor  
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· Differential Lease Payment (DLP):  The Government may agree to pay 
a differential between the BAH paid to Service members and local market 
rents 
· Investment (Joint Venture):  The Government may take an equity stake 
in a housing construction enterprise 
· Interim Leases:   The Government may lease private housing units while 
awaiting the completion of a project 
· Assignment of Service Members:  Service personnel may be assigned to 
housing in a particular project that they may otherwise not choose to 
occupy (tenant guarantee)  
· Build to Lease:  The Government may contract for the private 
construction of a housing project, and then lease its units (similar to 
Section 801 program) 
· Rental Guarantee:   The Government may guarantee a minimal 
occupancy rate or rental income for a housing project (similar to the 
Section 802 program)  
3. The MHPI Process 
Central features of the MHPI are its flexibility and its decentralized execution.  
However, projects tend to follow the same general progression.  First, the need for 
additional housing at an installation, either through the renovation of exiting housing or 
construction of new dwellings, is established by a site review and feasibility study 
conducted by the appropriate Service.  This examination includes an evaluation of the 
local private housing market and a cost/benefit comparison between the use of an MHPI 
package and traditional construction methods.  The results are briefed to the OSD Office 
of Competitive Sourcing and Privatization.  If the concept is judged adequate, it is 
approved and the Service is authorized to develop an appropriate solicitation proposal.  
Congress is notified before the completed solicitation is issued to private industry.  
Congress is again notified when the successful solicitation response is selected and before 
a contract is awarded.  (Else, 2001) 
Although the MHPI planning and operations are delegated through DoD to the 
component services, Congress maintains project approval and oversight authority.  To 
facilitate standardization within and comparability between MHPI projects, John B. 
Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary for Industrial Affairs and Installations, released a 
MHPI Policies and Procedures Memo on 09 October 1998.  The memo’s  stated purpose 
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was to define key events and responsibilities from initial project screening to contract 
award through post-award oversight and reporting.  The memo describes the process 
required to execute individual privatization projects; policies required of individual 
projects proposed under MHPI; required program tools and instruments; and the financial 
feasibility model.  
In addition to demonstrating that the installation has a continuing need for MFH, 
planned MHPI projects must also demonstrate that life cycle cost (LCC) savings will 
likely result.  To gain approval for a MHPI project, without a waiver, estimated LCC 
must be equal to or less than an identical MILCON funded alternative.  The specific OSD 
policy regarding LCC comparisons is discussed la ter in this chapter. 
4. Funding MHPI 
MHPI project funding is provided by Congress in the yearly Defense 
Authorization Acts, through the Family Housing Improvement Fund, specifically created 
to support only MHPI projects.  The fund receives money from four sources; (1) direct 
Congressional appropriations when MHPI are approved, (2) Congressionally approved 
transfers from MILCON accounts when projects originally planned for traditional 
construction are converted to MHPI projects, (3) proceeds from property conveyances, 
(4) proceeds from property or facility leases.  The fund provides money for MHPI project 
implementation including planning, solicitation, award, administration and initial 
Government capital requirements.  (Consult Appendix B, Public Law 104 -106, Section 
2883 for exact language.) 
5. Budget Scoring for MHPI Projects 
Each of the authorities created for the MHPI has an associated budget score.  The 
scoring used for the MHPI was drafted to comply with the Federal Credit Reform Act of 
1990 and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, as interpreted by Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 and specific MHPI Guidelines issued by the OMB on 
June 25, 1997.  These guidelines remained in effect for the first 20 projects using MHPI 
authorities, and will then be adjusted to incorporate lessons learned.  The budget scoring 
percentages are calculated based on the Government’s “degree of exposure”, or the 
statistical probability that a contractor’s default on the project will have a financial 
impact on the Federal budget/deficit.  (Else, 2001)  
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Because of budget scoring, the MHPI tool or tools selected for employment in any 
given housing project have a significant influence on project’s budgetary impact.  The 
amount of budgetary authority that must be alloc ated to a project is a direct function of 
those alternative authorizations selected for use.  (Else, 2001)  Appendix C arranges the 
twelve alternative authorizations in ascending order of budget impact and indicates those 
authorities used in the first sixteen MHPI projects with awarded contracts.  Thus far, the 
services have tended away from authorities with high budget scoring and gravitated 
toward those with lower budget scores.  
6. OSD and Congressional MHPI Reporting Requirements  
After delegating MHPI operations to the component services, Congress and OSD 
instituted reporting requirements in order to maintain the pulse of the MHPI program, 
providing a means for oversight, policy guidance, standardization and information 
sharing.  The primary tools are the Family Housing Master Plans (FHMP) and Program 
Evaluation Plans (PEP). 
a. Family Housing Master Plans 
Beginning in July 2000, Congress required each service to submit and then 
annually update a Family Housing Master Plan (FHMP), demonstrating how they 
intended to meet OSD’s goal of eliminating inadequate housing by 2010.  The FHMP 
addresses all MFH related issues including the service’s vision and their road map for 
achieving MFH adequacy standards.  The plan specifics include: 
· Each installation’s current MFH inventory, condition and requirements 
· Estimated costs and method (new MILCON, MILCON renovation, 
privatization) to bring required MFH up to new adequacy standards  
· MILCON and MHPI plans, by installation, by fiscal year  
· Surplus MFH disposal plans, by in stallation, by fiscal year  
· Estimated funding required to properly maintain and operate MFH 
· BAH requirements associated with units conveyed under MHPI  
b. Program Evaluation Plans 
Beginning January 2001, OSD’s Office of Competitive Sourcing and 
Privatization, requires each service component to submit a Program Evaluation Plan 
(PEP), semi-annually (March and September), for all awarded MHPI projects.  
Information for the PEP flows upward from installations through the service component 
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level to the HRSO.  The PEP is a tool for the services and OSD to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of MHPI projects, measuring their effectiveness, and evaluating their strengths 
and weaknesses.  Lessons learned from PEPs are disseminated and incorporated into 
future projects. 
7. OSD MHPI Policies 
While delegating MHPI operations to the service components, various OSD level 
offices issued policy guidance memos to standardize the MHPI process and avert 
problems encountered with earlier housing privatization programs.  
a. Property Taxes 
Robert Meyer, Director of the Housing Revitalization Support Office, 
issued a policy memo on 10 July 1998 clarifying property tax treatment when negotiating 
MHPI deals with private developers.  It stated, “since property taxes have a significant 
impact on potential project cash flows, they must be considered when formulating the 
project concept.”  DoD installation and project leaders are encouraged to work with the 
private developers in obtaining favorable tax concessions from state and local tax 
authorities.  The memo further states that,  
The contractor will be responsible for the payment of any real estate taxes 
assessed on the project.  In the absence of clear, written direction from 
state and local tax authorities that property taxes are not applicab le, or are 
reduced, the offeror’s proposal shall assume that property taxes will be 
assessed on the project and include such costs in its financial projections.  
The offeror’s proposal shall also include a plan for use of any savings 
realized from an exemption from or the abatement of property taxes on the 
project, or a failure or inability of the local taxing authority to assess 
property taxes on the project.  The service will favor proposals which 
dedicate any such savings to enhancement or expansion of the project or 
which otherwise provide the benefit to the government.  
b. Utilities 
John B. Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial 
Affairs and Installations, issued a policy memo on 08 September 1998 clarifying payment 
of utility services for MHPI projects.  In part, the memo stated,  
projects under this program must define the amount of rent revenue 
available to the developer by subtracting from the BAH a predetermined 
amount set aside for utilities.  This allowance for utilities would per mit 
payment of utilities from within the BAH, either directly by the member 
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or passed through the developer.  This method will ensure that developers 
can appropriately estimate the amount of cash flow used to finance 
housing privatization projects.  Servic e members who conserve utilities 
would be able to keep the difference between the allowance and the actual 
cost, whereas those who exceed the allowance would pay out -of-pocket 
for excessive usage.  
c. Impact Aid 
Nicole Bayert, Associate General Counsel for Environment and 
Installations, issued a memo on 09 February 1999, recommending a school impact aid 
policy.  A local education agency (LEA) receives low-level impact aid for children 
attending its schools when an installation transfers title to land and existing housing on 
that land to a developer, and the developer retains title to all new housing structures built 
on that land under the MHPI.  Since the developer owns the land and the dwellings, 
property taxes apply and low -level aid is paid to the LEA.  A LEA receives high-level 
impact aid for children attending its schools when an installation retains title to the land, 
leases it to a developer, but transfers title of existing homes to the developer, and the 
developer retains title to new homes built on the leased land.  Even though the developer 
owns the dwellings, high-level impact aid is paid because the project is exempt from state 
and local property taxes since the underlying land is still owned by the Federal 
Government.   
d. Life Cycle Costs: (LCC) 
Joseph K. Sikes, Director of the Competitive Sourcing and Privatization 
Office, released a housing privatization life cycle cost policy memo on 11 February 2002.   
The stated purpose of the memo is to ensure identified costs are accurate, 
simple and consistent across the military services to facilitate appropriate comparisons 
between identical MHPI and MILCON alternatives.  Specific guidance outlines LCC 
estimating methodologies including provisions for utility service, excess BAH recovery, 
out-year renovations, and project planning/inspections.  An appendix to the memo 
provided the services with a standardized methodology for calculating consistent and 
reasonable MILCON O&M costs.  Sunk costs are defined as including government -
owned land and improvement expenditures incurred before project approval and not 
recoverable regardless of the alternative selected.  
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e. Leverage 
John B. Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial 
Affairs and Installations, issued a policy memo on 09 October 1998, contain ing MHPI 
project leverage requirements.  The leverage ration is a measure of the funds required to 
complete a housing project under MHPI compared to the amount of funds required to 
complete a project under traditional MILCON of identical scope and size.  To gain 
approval, a privatization project must obtain a minimum three to one leverage ratio, akin 
to getting three times as much housing construction and renovation under MHPI as 
MILCON could provide, or spending only one dollar under MHPI as would require three 
dollars under MILCON.  Leverage ratio is calculated by dividing the estimated MILCON 
development cost by the MHPI scored amount.  Development costs are different from life 
cycle costs (LCC), and include only the funds immediately required for construction, 
renovation and demolition. 
C. AIR FORCE, ARMY AND NAVY MHPI APPROACHES 
With twelve MHPI projects either completed or in process as of 31 December 
2001, and several others nearing award, under solicitation, or in planning, discernable 
patterns have emerged as each service component uses the flexibility the twelve 
authorities provided to pursue its unique MFH vision.  The Air Force is taking a tentative 
approach, insisting all MHPI projects be ‘severable’ from the main installation, while still 
relying on MILCON for the majority of its housing needs.  The Army is focusing on 
large installation privatization efforts under a whole -community concept, using a one-
step Request for Qualifications source selection process, and relying on MILCON at most 
of its smaller installations.  The Navy is using Public -Private Ventures in an effort to 
obtain maximum financial returns for its housing investments and shorter contracts to 
maintain flexibility.  The service components’ long-term strategies are outlined below 
and serve as the basis for analysis.  Note that MHPI applies only to military installations 
within the United States and its territories and possessions, not to installations located in 
foreign nations. 
1. Air Force 
The Air Force plans to privatize a total of 32,900 units under 34 different MHPI 
projects, representing 30% of its total MFH inventory.  
52 
a. The Air Force Housing Problem  
The total Air Force MFH requirement in 2011 is estimated at 
approximately 109,000 units, including 62,000 Air Force owned and op erated, 14,100 
Host Nation owned and 32,900 owned by MHPI partners.  In 1999, the total Air Force 
MFH inventory of 104,937 units included 30,798 adequate units, 65,254 inadequate units 
(accounting for 62% of the total), and 8,885 units already conveyed as part of the first ten 
MHPI projects.  Revitalizing the remaining 65,254 inadequate units was estimated to cost 
$7 billion through traditional MILCON methods, and would take at least 20 years at 
current funding levels.  (AF-FHMP, 1999) 
b. Air Force Plan to Remedy the Problem 
The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) administers 
the MHPI for the Secretary of the Air Force through their Housing Privatization Office 
(HPO).  The AFCEE-HPO describes its plan as a program that matches Air Force 
requirements to real estate market opportunities to provide the best value housing, 
maximizing developer creativity, and returning a transaction with a high potential for 
successful completion.  Under this MHPI plan, private developers own the housing units, 
located on private land or land leased from the Air Force, and Air Force personnel 
receive BAH and pay rent to the private developer.  Rents are less than BAH rates, with 
the difference accounting for a utility allowance, designed to keep out -of-pocket expenses 
at zero for the average tenant.  The developer manages and maintains the property for 50 
years.  Tenants pay utilities directly to the utility provider without government or 
developer involvement.  (AF-FHMP, 1999) 
Although the Air Force believes MHPI is a key element to eliminating 
inadequate MFH, it intends to use traditional MILCON methods to accomplish most of 
its MFH revitalization.  MILCON will renovate 45,650 units or 70% of the remaining 
inadequate units inventory.  Host Nation construction programs in Japan and South Korea 
will revitalize an additional 3,398 inadequate units, with traditional MILCON used for 
other overseas requirements, mainly in Germany, Japan and South Korea.  MHPI projects 
will upgrade 16,206 units, in addition to the 8,885 units already privatized, and assume 
control of almost 8,000 units that are adequate, but intended for privatization.  After 
completing all MHPI projects, almost 33,000 MFH units will reside under privatization, 
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representing 30% of the total Air Force MFH inventory, having served to upgrade about 
one-third of the originally inadequate units.  The Air Force plans 251 construction and 
renovation projects, with 34 (14%) being MHPI and 217 (86%) being MILCON.  (AF -
FHMP, 1999)  The Air Force averages 968 units per MHPI deal. 
Major General Earnest Robbins, who oversees the Air Force’s MHPI 
program, admits that his service’s more tentative approach to MHPI precludes it from 
meeting the DoD guidance to eliminate inadequate MFH by 2010.  He expects the Air 
Force to eliminate inadequate housing by 2014, primarily due to predicted MILCON 
funding shortages necessary to upgrade Air Force owned/operated units.  Robbins says 
the Air Force prefers a “balanced approach,” preferring privatization only at bases 
located in strong commercial housing markets, and intending to reinvest savings from 
MHPI projects into other MILCON projects.  Robust commercial housing markets ensure 
the Air Force and developer could easily obtain civilian tenants or sell the housing units 
if the Air Force no longer needs them.  (Cahlink, 2001)  
The Air Force uses three criteria to determine the appropriate investment 
strategy for revitalizing housing at each base.  If all criteria are met, privatization is 
generally selected.  If any one of the three cr iteria is not met, the traditional MILCON 
option is generally selected. 
(1) Severability.  The Air Force requires privatized family 
housing to be physically separate (either geographically separate or severable) from other 
installation functions.  To be eligible for privatization, it must be possible, but not 
required, to place a fence around the housing area and to obtain access to the area from a 
public road.  This ensures that if, at a later date, the demand by military families is 
insufficient to fill housing, alternate civilian renters could access the housing estate 
without entering the operational portion of the installation.  (AF -FHMP, 1999)  This is a 
significant difference between the Air Force’s MHPI approach and that of the Army and 
Navy. 
(2) Economic Feasibility – ‘Scored’ Cost.  The privatization 
candidate must obtain the minimum three to one leverage ratio required by DoD policy.  
The scored cost, under OMB guidance, cannot exceed one-third of the estimated 
MILCON cost to complete a project of identical scope.  (AF-FHMP, 1999) 
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(3) Economic Feasibility – Life Cycle Costs.  The LCC 
associated with privatization must be less than the LCC for an identical MILCON project.  
The Air Force defines the MHPI LCC as the sum of the OMB scored costs and the net 
present value (NPV) of the expected BAH paid to service members living in the 
privatized units.  Government ownership LCC is the sum of the MILCON construction 
costs and the NPV of all estimated future costs for maintenance, repair, utility, 
management and any other services provided over the life of the units.  (AF -FHMP, 
1999) 
2. Army 
The Army plans to privatize 71,790 units under 28 different MHPI projects, 
representing 58% of its total MFH inventory.  (Army-FHMP, 2002) 
a. The Army Housing Problem  
In 2001, the Army maintained a worldwide inventory of 122,977 MFH 
units, and predicted a need for 123,589 units by 2009.  These units include 34,575 
adequate units, 58,860 inadequate units (accounting for 48% of the total), 4,080 leased 
under the section 801 program, 9,735 leased overseas, and 15,727 privatized under the 
Army’s first four MHPI projects.  Revitalizing the remaining inadequate units was 
estimated to cost $6 billion using solely traditional MILCON funding and would take at 
least 20 years to complete.  (Army-FHMP, 2001) 
b. Army Plan to Remedy the Problem  
Although its first MHPI contract was not awarded until September 1999, 
the Army has fully embraced housing privatization as the best way to solve the MFH 
problem, quickly and efficiently.  The Army is moving forward rapidly with plans to 
entirely privatize most of its large installations, eliminating all inadequate MFH by 2008.  
The Army plans MILCON projects at overseas locations and smaller CONUS 
installations.   
By 2008, Army MHPI projects will control 71,790 privatized MFH units, 
located at 33 installations in the United States, accounting for 58% of the Army’s total 
MFH inventory, and over three-fourths of its domestic inventory.  This is a slight 
reduction from the MHPI plan set forth in 1998, calling for the privatization of 85,000 
units at 43 installations.  The reduction resulted from Congressional requests to slow the 
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effort, suggesting MHPI be used to supplement MILCON, not replace it.  The Army 
averages 2,564 MFH units under each MHPI cont ract. 
The first four MHPI projects were Forts Carson, Hood, Lewis and Meade, 
accounting for 15,727 units.  They were carefully chosen and designated as pilots 
because they reflected diverse market conditions, which would serve to develop lessons 
learned and sound methodologies for aggressively completing the remaining 24 MHPI 
projects, accounting for an additional 56,063 units, in just three years.  
(1) Whole Base Concept.  The Army’s MHPI umbrella 
program is called Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) and seeks to develop entire 
communities, not just housing units.  Under RCI, the Army establishes long -term (50-
year) business relationships with private sector developers for the purpose of improving 
entire base communities.  Within this holistic approach,  one developer hired the same 
architect who designed the Olympic village for the recent summer games in Sydney, 
Australia.  The Army provides long-term interests in the form of both land leases and 
existing MFH asset conveyance to the developers.  In turn,  the developers become whole -
community managers and received tenants BAH as rent.   
(2) RFQ Source Selection Process.  To promote a true 
partnering effort between the Army and the developer, the solicitation process was 
modified after the Army’s first MHPI project at Fort Carson, which used a traditional 
request for proposal (RFP) concept.  RCI solicitations are now handled using a single -
step Request for Qualifications (RFQ) process.  The RFQ is in sharp contrast to the more 
traditional Request for Proposal (RFP) approach, where private sector offerors submit 
very detailed development proposals in response to a detailed Government request.  
Under the RFQ framework, all interested contractors submit a qualification package, 
which is a much shorter, less detailed, more general conceptual plan, along with a 
summary of significant experience and relevant qualifications.  From the body of 
qualification packages, the Army selects a single “development partner” and enters into 
one-on-one negotiations for the final design and contract.  The RFQ process emphasizes 
the developer’s experience, preliminary concept appeal, their financial and organizational 
capabilities, past performance, cost estimates, and their ability and plan to use small 
business concerns.  Following source selection, the Army and contractor work closely for 
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up to six months, quantifying detailed plans and forging a blueprint for revitalizing the 
installation’s residential community.  The actual contract is awarded and construction 
begun after the detailed plans are completed and approved by Congress.  
3. Navy 
The Navy intends to privatize 21,985 units under 18 different MHPI agreements, 
representing approximately one-third of its total MFH inventory.  (Navy-FHMP, 2001)  
These Navy figures do not include the Marine Corps MFH.  
a. The Navy Housing Problem  
In 2001, the Navy maintained a worldwide inventory of 60,133 MFH 
units, and predicted a need for 68,499 units by 2005.  The current inventory includes 
32,390 adequate units and 27,743 inadequate units (accounting for 46% of the total).  The 
Navy also has access to 589 units privatized under its first two MHPI projects.  
Revitalizing the remaining inadequate units was estimated to cost $3.8 billion using 
solely traditional MILCON funding and would take at least 20 years to complete.  (Navy-
FHMP, 2001) 
b. Navy Plan to Remedy the Problem  
The Navy pioneered the MHPI effort in 1994 when it obtained authority 
from Congress to create Public -Private Ventures (PPV) as a way to mitigate its MFH 
problems.  Progress was slow, with one PPV contract awarded in 1996 and one in 1997, 
making 589 additional units available to Navy families.  The PPV authorities, originally 
granted to the Navy only, were included in the 1996 MHPI legislation and made available 
to all services .   
By 2005, the Navy plans to complete sixteen additional PPV deals at 
eleven bases, with some bases having two or three different PPV contracts to account for 
all of the privatized housing.  The Navy plans to convey 8,669 adequate units to PPV 
between 2001 and 2010.  PPV renovates 5,144 inadequate units (27% of 18,801), while 
MILCON renovates 13,657 units.  New PPV construction replaces 3,739 (67% of 5,569) 
demolished units, while MILCON replaces 1,830 demolished units.  PPV and MILCON 
will demolish and not replace 3,373 inadequate units at bases with excess capacity.  
Between 2001 and 2010, PPV reduces the overall MFH deficit at underserved bases by 
3,844 units (88% of 4,361) through new construction, while MILCON reduces the MFH 
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deficit by only 517 units.  (Navy-FHMP, 2001)  The Navy averages 1,221 units under 
each PPV agreement.  
(1) Public -Private Ventures (PPV).  The Navy views 
privatization not only as a way to improve MFH, but also as an investment opportunity.  
By forming limited liability companies with developers, the PPV arrangements require 
the Navy to accept a greater financial burden, but enable it to share in the revenues 
(primarily BAH, but also liquidation proceeds) generated by the project.  The Navy’s 
revenue share is negotiated up front and may be used for repairs, reserve accounts, or 
back to the Navy for housing needs at other Navy locations.  The deals involve both on -
base government land and private land, and include many of the same features pursued 
by the Army and Air Force.   
(2) Short-Term Contracts Ending in Liquidation.  While some 
Navy deals are for 30 to 50 years, with the housing reverting to Navy control at 
termination, some are also much shorter, with provisions to sell the property on the open 
real estate market.  The shorter  deals, at smaller bases and encompassing fewer units, are 
for ten to fifteen years and allow for the sale of individual units as early as the sixth year 
of operations.  Current residents have purchase priority and may be offered reduced 
closing costs and relief from real estate commissions.  When the deal reaches full term, 
the PPV liquidates the remaining units on the open market.  Because it is a full business 
partner in the PPV, with a significant financial stake, the Navy receives a substantial 
portion of the liquidation proceeds.  These proceeds may be reinvested in another local 
PPV if a housing shortage still persists, or they may be invested in a PPV at a different 
Navy base with MFH shortages.  
4. Marine Corps 
This thesis does not detail the Marine Corps’ use of the MHPI authorities because 
it has fewer locations than the other three services, resulting in only one awarded project 
and two in planning as of 31 December 2001.   
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Due to the complexity of the deals, the unfamiliarity of  DoD business managers 
with these types of deals, and the uncharted policy and cultural waters, the MHPI began 
at a turtle’s pace, but has gained speed and momentum, especially after delegation from 
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OSD to the service component level.  Although OSD maintains oversight and sets policy, 
the distinct approaches taken by the Air Force, Army and Navy demonstrate the inherent 
flexibility built into the MHPI program and their long-standing propensity to differentiate 
themselves from one another.  The services have recognized the MHPI authorities as a 
unique opportunity to improve their long-standing MFH circumstances, and have taken 
aggressive steps to institute the program, improving the overall quality of life for 




MHPI has similarities to and includes many improvements from the Wherry, 
Capehart, Sections 801 and 802 programs.  Its potential is quite promising, but the 
program is still immature, with only a minimum amount of trending analysis possible 
since it has yet to develop a meaningful operating history.  Numerous legislation and 
government policies effect MHPI, with both critics and supporters concerned about the 
many assumptions that are based on estimates of future events.  
B. MILCON INSUFFICIENCY 
Although other programs such as Wherry, Capehart, and Section 801/802 have 
come and gone, DoD has relied upon MILCON appropriations since 1949 as the primary 
method to supplement the private rental market, thereby ensuring military families are 
adequately housed.  However, Government owned and operated housing has consistently 
failed to solve the MFH problem.  Given its political nature, MILCON is squeezed out by 
other looming Federal budget priorities such as Social Security, Medicare/Medicaid, 
possible prescription drug coverage, and other social programs.  Additionally, within the 
constrained defense budget, MFH is considered important but competes with other 
priorities such as homeland security, endless global stability/support operations, the 
1990’s procurement holiday hang over effects, and transformation initiatives.  Looking 
forward, MILCON is unlikely to ever receive the funding required to solve the MFH 
problem.   
C. MHPI IMPROVES MFH 
Although not intended as a complete replacement for the traditional MF H owned 
and operated by DoD, the MHPI program is rapidly expanding its inventory and 
influence among service and installation leaders and military families.  Based on awarded 
projects and those currently planned for or in solicitation, MHPI will account for over 





1. MHPI is Faster Than MILCON 
In 1992, GAO informed Congress that 72% of MFH was over 25 years old, and 
that half of DoD’s 400,000 MFH unit s would need major renovations over the next ten 
years, at a cost of $11 billion.  (GAO -92-09FS)  Despite these warnings, the condition of 
MFH had changed little prior to MHPI implementation.  In fact, when viewed as a 
percentage of total inventories, the inadequacy of MFH, as well as the financial and time 
costs of eliminating the problem actually increased throughout the 1990’s.  Using a 
combination of MILCON and MHPI projects, DoD plans to eliminate inadequate MFH 
by 2010.  While the success or failure of this plan remains to be realized, and is highly 
dependant on both MILCON and BAH funding streams, the likelihood of success seems 
greater than at any time since Capehart.  The first thirteen MHPI projects achieved an 
average leverage of over six to one, providing six times as much construction or 
renovation capital as would have been available under MILCON.  This leverage is an 
example of MHPI’s ability to dramatically increase the rate of MFH replacement and 
renovation.   
2. MHPI is (Skeptically) Less Costly Than MILCON 
While each entity involved arrives at differing results, all agree that, on average, 
MHPI projects have lower life cycle costs (LCC) than identical MILCON funded 
projects.  Based on consolidated Program Evaluation Plan (PEP) data submitted  by 
individual MHPI projects, the HRSO calculates LCC savings of 14 to 16% for the first 
thirteen MHPI awarded projects.  (PEP, 2001) 
GAO recently estimated aggregate LCC savings for the first ten awarded projects 
to be slightly less than 5%, with three of  the ten projects being more expensive than their 
MILCON alternatives, citing three reasons for the differing results.  First, GAO analysis 
used current cost estimates, whereas the services used cost estimates available when they 
prepared the analysis, months or years prior to project approval.  Second, GAO 
considered the increased costs of MHPI resulting from the BAH increase initiative.  
Third, service LCC were inconsistently prepared and did not include all relevant costs 
because they were completed befo re DoD published its February 2002 LCC policy 
memo.  (GAO-02-624) 
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a. Life Cycle Cost Components 
In calculating its LCC estimates, GAO primarily adhered to DoD’s LCC 
policy memo guidelines, but deviated from the policy in two areas, concluding that these 
two areas were predisposed to favor MHPI projects.  GAO included contract oversight 
and administrative cost estimates within the MHPI analysis, where DoD had not included 
them, which increased the aggregate MHPI LCC estimates.  GAO also applied an 
alternative methodology for determining operations and maintenance costs for the 
MILCON analysis, decreasing the aggregate MILCON LCC estimates.  DoD has since 
added estimated contract oversight costs to its LCC analysis policy.  (GAO -02-624) 
Another criticism of MHPI LCC estimates is that DoD does not include 
some installation contributions to MHPI projects, such as property conveyances or 
nominal land leases.  Because the conveyance of existing government -owned housing 
(including adequate, inadequate and condemned), government land, or the forgone 
private market value of nominal land leases do not require government expenditures and 
do not affect the Federal budget, the value of the property conveyed or leased is not 
included in budgetary scores, leverage calculations or LCC analysis.  Including these 
sunk costs or estimating the true market value of nominally leased land would increase 
the LCC estimates of MHPI projects, making them less favorable when compared to their 
MILCON counterparts.  However, DoD argues that its contributions to MHPI projects, 
whether scored or not, are key ingredients making the project financially feasible for 
developers.  DoD also stated that most of the MFH units conveyed require either 
renovation or demolition, increasing costs under both the MHPI or MILCON alternatives.  
(GAO-02-624) 
b. Long-Term LCC Estimation Difficulties 
A final LCC consideration is that because these analyses use numerous 
assumptions and estimates, projected over a thirty to fifty year contract life, actual costs 
may vary substantially from the initial analysis results.  Even small changes in a single 
LCC estimating variable can have dramatic impact on the aggregate LCC outcome when 
projected over the life of the contract.  In hindsight, actual LCC may be significant ly 
higher or lower than initially estimated.  Also, once an alternative (MHPI or MILCON) is 
chosen and initiated, its results can be recorded and measured, but the alternative not 
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selected can still only be estimated.  The bottom line is that the many assu mptions and 
uncertainties in the estimate components used to determine LCC make if difficult to 
achieve reliable estimates of costs over the terms an extended contract.  (GAO -02-624) 
c. Building Up To Cost Ceilings 
Historical privatization examples may explain why MHPI life cycle costs 
tend to be marginally less costly than MILCON alternatives.  To gain approval and 
funding, section 801/802 projects were required to demonstrate at least a 5% construction 
savings when compared to an identical MILCON alternat ive.  Based on the MILCON 
estimate, DoD set a maximum allowable construction cost ensuring that all successful 
801/802 bids would be less costly than the MILCON alternative.  DoD also provided the 
rationale, assumptions and methodologies for determining these ceiling costs to potential 
bidders as part of the request for proposal package.  Since DoD fixed the maximum price 
and the quantity of housing, competition for awards tended to focus on providing the 
most housing quality within the ceiling cost.  GAO found this to be the primary reason 
why section 801/802 constructions were only marginally less costly than MILCON.  
(GAO-87-13BR)  The Wherry and Capehart programs also had construction ceiling costs, 
based on FHA mortgage insurance limits, influencing the  sizes, types and quality of the 
housing produced.  This same phenomenon may carry over to MHPI projects with 
services and developers attempting to provide as much square footage, amenities and 
community perks as possible under the BAH cash flow models.  
d. Consideration Other Than Cost  
While MHPI tend to be less costly than a MILCON project, it appears to 
be more costly than similar housing provided through BAH, even after considering the 
affects of the BAH initiative.  Using the same cost data from multiple studies presented in 
Chapter III, and assuming that MHPI is 10% less costly than MILCON, MHPI is still 17 
to 34% more costly than obtaining housing from the private sector market through BAH.  
This comparison may only be valid for incremental changes to an installation’s MFH 
inventory, and not valid when considering whole -base privatizations. 
Responding to a GAO report, published in March 2000, Randall Yim, 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations, summarized the ongoing debate 
regarding the prospects for MHPI LCC savings.  The report described DoD’s LCC 
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savings analyses as incomplete, inaccurate and overstated, and revised lofty savings 
estimates downward.  
Mr. Yim wrote that,  
The GAO report states that the life cycle analyses for the (12) init ial 
projects indicate long-term savings of about 11% when compared to costs 
of MILCON.  We consider these savings to be an important benefit of the 
program.  However, of equal importance is the need to fix the inadequate 
housing inventory of over 180,000 units within a reasonable period of 
time.  As we pointed out in our comments to the GAO report of June 
1998, these economic analyses assume the availability of funding for 
MILCON projects adequate to construct comparable housing projects.  An 
important, albeit unfortunate, underlying reality is that such funding has 
not been available and that a paramount benefit of privatization is the role 
early delivery of adequate housing provides in improving the quality of 
life of our members.  We simply cannot meet ou r 2010 goal without a 
substantive privatization program.  (GAO -00-71) 
Other DoD officials, before and after Mr. Yim, have echoed his 
comments.  Any savings realized through MHPI are better than the more expensive 
MILCON approach.  And, even if only marginally less costly, MHPI is available, 
whereas the necessary MILCON appropriations are simply not available in sufficient 
amounts to fix the MFH inadequacy problem by 2010 target date.  
3. MFH Increases MFH Inventories 
On multiple occasions over the last 25 years, Congress asked GAO to examine 
requests by DoD for additional MFH, and GAO has consistently, with few exceptions, 
criticized DoD for overestimating its need for MFH.  GAO’s primary argument, 
supported by other oversight and analysis agencies, is that DoD uses inconsistent and 
flawed methodologies for determining its total MFH requirements.  DoD and service 
component analysis consistently underestimate the quantity and quality of housing 
available to military families in the real estate markets surrounding installations, which in 
turn, overestimates the need for MFH on the installation.  Too much MFH, coupled with 
data showing that it costs DoD significantly more than private sector housing (funded 
through BAH), causes DoD to overspend on housing programs  and results in significant 
economic disparity between those who live in MFH and those who live in private sector 
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housing.  (sources include multiple GAO Reports, CNA and DoD IG Studies from 1978 
to 2002) 
[This thesis does not question the MFH requirements  determination process, 
which is a complicated matter that is closely related to the MHPI program, but is outside 
the scope of this thesis.] 
After considering the existing MFH inventory and that adequate housing is 
available to military families in the loc al private sector market, DoD’s stated policy is to 
build and maintain no more than 90% of the total MFH requirement at an installation.  
With consideration to adequate conveyances, demolitions, renovations and new 
construction, the first thirteen awarded MHPI projects increased their installation’s MFH 
inventory by 11%, reflecting the services’ belief that an adequate quantity and quality of 
housing is not available to military families in the local markets surrounding these 
thirteen installations.  (PEP, 2001) 
D. BUDGET SCORING, LEVERAGE AND FINANCING CHOICES  
In 1990, the Air Force labeled 67,000 of its MFH units substandard, but had 
received inadequate MILCON funding over the recent years to renovate and replace the 
units.  Searching for a solution to its MFH problem, the Air Force proposed a Capehart -
type installment-purchase financing plan to supplement its MILCON appropriations.  An 
essential element of the program was that budget authority would not be accounted for in 
the year that funds were authorized, but rather in the year that the payments were due.  
Supported by GAO, OMB rejected the proposal as inconsistent with the Budget 
Enforcement Act and its own budget scoring guidelines.  The Air Force abandoned its 
new Capehart plan.  (GAO-91-181) 
1. Budget Scoring 
Just as budget scoring affected the Sections 801 and 802 programs’ demise and 
prevented Capehart’s resurgence, it also impacted the MHPI projects significantly.  
Regardless of the LCC estimates, leverage, or other advantages, an MHPI project mus t be 
‘affordable’ under OMB’s budget scoring rules.  Essentially, MHPI projects are made 
affordable because their largest cash flow contributor is BAH, which is not budget scored 
since it is only paid to service members with families.  If the service member is 
eliminated due to force reductions, DoD and Congress (and future Congresses) no longer 
65 
incur the financial obligation of his BAH.  Except when sections 2874, 2876 or 2882 (a) 
and (b) are used, there is no direct obligation for DoD to pay any recurring  fees to the 
developer.  Although authorized under MHPI, these three authorities have not yet been 
used in an awarded contract, but they may fill critical gaps in some future extenuating 
circumstance.  
After reviewing Appendix C of this thesis, it is readily apparent that DoD 
intentionally avoids using those MHPI authorities that create the greatest budget scoring 
impact.  The first authorities of choice are those with little or no budget scoring impact, 
such as sections 2878, 2881 and 2888.  While these authorities add value to the project by 
optimizing the overall deal by enhancing tenant quality of life or reducing developers’ 
financial uncertainty, they provide little cash to developers for the immediate needs of 
new construction and major renovations, which is the core function of the MHPI.   
2. Financing Choices 
To form the basic financial structure of the deals, the services primarily use direct 
equity investments (S2875) or direct loans (S2873) to fill the development gap.  The 
development gap is defined as the difference between the MHPI project’s total 
development cost, and the sum of both the private sector equity and the private sector 
financing available to the developer.  (Yim, 2000) 
With moderate to high budget scores, the Air Force and Marine Corps favor debt 
structures.  They provide the maximum financial capacity to the developers upfront, but 
cash flow back to the service component in later years is limited to nominal interest 
payments and debt repayment.  Thirty to forty year repayment terms for these loans are 
similar to or slightly longer than private sector loans.  Developers find the direct 
government loans highly attractive because the interest rates range from 0 to 4%, which 
is much lower than the private sector rates ranging from 6 to 8.5%.  Three projects even 
include interest payments only, with principle payments deferred, for the first ten years of 
the loan term. 
Equity structures, favored by the Navy’s PPV, involve a larger service financial 
commitment to the project upfront, but ar e expected to provide a greater cash flow back 
to the project and the service in the out years.  The Navy plans to use the higher cash flow 
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from BAH streams and unit liquidations to recoup their initial equity investments and 
reinvest in future PPV’s if they are needed.  The Army used both debt and equity 
financing on its first two projects, but required neither in its recently awarded projects at 
Forts Meade and Lewis.  On these projects, conveyance of existing units and cash flows 
from higher anticipated BAH rates resulted in no development gap requiring additional 
debt of equity from appropriated funds. 
3. Leverage  
Leverage is a demonstration of obtaining greater value from the available 
appropriations.  DoD policy defines three to one as the minimum acceptable leverage 
ratio.  Leverage ratio is calculated by dividing the estimated MILCON development cost 
by the MHPI scored amount.  The two projects must be of identical scope and size.   
While leverage is a useful yardstick with which to measure and compar e MHPI 
potential, its purity as a true gage is slightly suspect.  It is important to note a distinction 
between the two comparable figures in this calculation.  The MILCON development cost 
numerator is relatively fixed.  It does not include all estimated LCC, primarily including 
only those funds required upfront and necessary for construction, renovation and 
demolition.  The MHPI denominator is much more variable, including only the ‘scored’ 
amount for the NPV of its LCC, making it a function of the LCC est imates, the 
authorities used to pay for those LCC, and the degree of financial risk exposure the 
Government incurs from those authorities. 
4. Scoring and Leverage Effects  
The actual leverage varies across awarded projects depending on the basic 
financial structure used (equity or debt) and the number of existing units conveyed to the 
developer.  Thus far, MHPI has achieved an average leverage ratio of 6.4:1, with 
individual project leverages ranging from 3:1 to 20:1.  Fort Carson and Lackland AFB 
dubiously obtained the highest leverage ratios at 20:1 and 8:1, respectively, due to a lack 
of clear scoring policy.  Lackland was close to award and Carson had progressed 
substantially through the solicitation process when OMB published its final MHPI budget 
scoring guidance in June 1997.  The memo requires the NPV of installation utility 
services provided to the privatization project be scored, and funds appropriated in the 
year of contract award.  While both Lackland and Carson provide installation utility 
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services to their MHPI projects, at no cost to the developer or tenants, these costs are not 
included in their budget scores.  Budget scoring these utility provisions reduces their 
leverage ratios to less than 3:1, and reduces the average leverage of all awarded projects 
to approximately 4:1.  (GAO-02-624)  More recent MHPI project awards, after the OMB 
scoring policy publishing, indicate ratios much closer to the 3:1 threshold.  
Direct loans also have a varying effect of budget scores and actual costs.  Direct 
loan budget scores range from approximately 30%, up to 100% of the loan amount, based 
on the predicted risk of default, and the estimated loss to the Government if default 
occurs.  If the project developer successfully repays the loan, Government losses are zero 
and the funds appropriated to cover the possibility of loss are not spent.  Conversely, the 
Government’s financial liability exceeds the scored amount if default occurs, and in a 
greater dollar amount than scored.  So, while obtaining funding appropria tions make 
budget scoring necessary, it should not eclipse LCC and tenant satisfaction as the main 
determinants of project success. 
E.  BAH IMPACT ON HOUSING DECISIONS 
Without question, BAH is the single most important element of the MHPI 
program because it  represents cash flowing into the projects to pay all costs, including 
construction, debt service, maintenance, management, utilities and contractor profit.  It is 
based on the targeted tenants’ rank, and is the primary consideration for all housing 
decisions made by both installation managers and DoD leaders, and service members, 
both on base and off base.  
1. Higher BAH Makes Privatization More Attractive  
As BAH rates adjust upward under the out -of-pocket elimination initiative, both 
developers and the ser vices should find MHPI projects more feasible as the cash flow 
increases.  Both industry and Government officials echo this thought.  
Chris Hunt, executive vice president of Hunt Construction, an El Paso developer 
that is working on Air Force and Navy housing privatization projects, says the military 
housing deals are “like an annuity” because they provide a steady stream of income over 
a long period.  (Cahlink, 2001)  “The genius of this program is using the housing 
allowances as a form of revenue for developers,” says Mahlon Apgar, former Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment.  (Cahlink, 2001)  
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Rising BAH also reduces the need for DoD’s equity or loan contributions at 
project inception.  With higher anticipated future cash flows from higher tenant BAH 
rates, private developers may find more private equity and loans available to them, at 
lower interest rates.  This condition shrinks the development gap, reducing DoD’s upfront 
financial contributions to the project, decreasing budget scores, and increasing leverage 
ratios, making more financial resources available to fund other service priorities.  The 
Army recently awarded projects at Forts Meade and Lewis requiring no cash or loan 
investments, beyond existing unit conveyances.  
2. Higher BAH Reduces the Need for MFH 
Ironically, while higher BAH rates make MHPI projects more attractive to 
developers, and more feasible for DoD and installation leaders, they may also reduce the 
need for MFH.  This phenomenon is explained through basic economic supply-demand 
theory.  The potential effects of higher BAH rates are most dramatic near installations 
located in normal, functioning real estate markets.  Higher BAH rates may have little or 
no effect in isolated locations, or in areas with severe building restrictions due to land or 
water shortages.   
In 1990, GAO endorsed housing allowances (BAH) as the preferred approach to 
provide housing to military families.  Among other reasons, GAO cited the short -term 
flexibility BAH allows in adjusting to DoD’s changing needs, and the flexibility offered 
to service members in selecting, from a variety of options, that housing that best meets 
their specific needs.  (GAO-90-30)   
GAO also believes that the BAH increases will ultimately change the composition 
of the MFH occupants since demographics are the primary determinant of demand for 
MFH.  Those who most aggressively seek and occupy MFH include junior and mid -grade 
enlisted personnel, those with spouses that do not work outside the home, and those with 
greater than average number of children.  (GAO -01-684)   
a. Higher BAH Rates Make Private Rental More Affordable  
Many studies indicate that the cost differential, represented by out -of-
pocket expenses, is the primary reason most service members choose to pursue on base 
housing.  However, the BAH initiative seeks to eliminate this cost differential by 2005, 
making off base rentals more affordable.  With this economic incentive removed from the 
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equation, military families will meet their housing needs based on the remaining choice 
factors.  Many service members, who previously sought on base housing, may now prefer 
and opt for a rental unit in the local private sector market, reducing the demand and need 
for DoD sponsored MFH, either MILCON or MHPI units.  (GAO -01-684) 
Additionally, higher BAH rates make more money available to service 
members to pursue rental housing and make ownership of rental property more lucrative.  
When business enterprise becomes more profitable, more firms enter the market over 
time, increasing the supply of rental housing.  The supply increases to meet market 
demand, allowing those service members on the margin to obtain civilian rentals rather 
than being forced to accept government quarters.  These two factors, an increased 
demand for private sector rentals and increased profitability from owning private sector 
rentals, both caused by higher BAH rates, may reduce the need, demand and desirability 
of both MILCON and MHPI units.  (GAO -01-684) 
b. Higher BAH Rates Make Home Ownership More Feasible 
In a 1995 internal housing study, DoD policy makers expressed long -
standing concerns regarding the ability of service members to purchase homes.  Military 
families are less than half as likely to purchase their own home than are civilian families 
of comparable educational and income levels.  Although home ownership increases 
(more than doubles) with rank and time-in-service, it remains significantly lower than 
civilian ownership, even among the most senior service levels.  Service members cited 
financial resource limitations and frequent moves as the primary reasons for not pursuing 
home ownership.  Over half of the current MFH residents simply felt they could not 
afford to own homes.  (RAND, 1999)   
Higher BAH rates may assuage some financial concerns by providing a 
greater resource cushion to meet the unexpected and unpredictable costs of home 
ownership, in addition to meeting regular mortgage, insurance and utility payments.  On 
the margin, some service members who previously opted for military or rental housing, 
because they felt purchasing was unaffordable, may now choose to purchase, reducing 
the demand for the other two housing components.  (GAO -01-684)  Home ownership 
affordability is not only beneficial to military families, but is also in keep ing with the 
broader Federal policy of encouraging home ownership through the tax code, 
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Government organizations like HUD/FHA, and quasi-government organizations like 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
c. Tax Implications of Higher BAH Rates 
Increasing BAH rates is an effective method to increase overall 
compensation to most service members.  Since BAH is not taxed at any level, every 
dollar of BAH increases represents one additional dollar of benefit available to the 
service member.  BAH increases directly benefit the two-thirds of all military families 
who live off base whether they actually spend the additional BAH on housing -related 
expenses or other family priorities.  Service members living in MFH may or may not 
benefit from BAH increases.  Those living in traditional MILCON housing will not 
benefit from higher BAH rates because their MFH is not funded through BAH.  Those 
living in or moving into MHPI units may experience larger or higher quality units, with 
more amenities than the MHPI project would otherwise have under the lower BAH rates.   
F. LOCKBOXES AND WINDFALLS 
Concerns about government contractors earning windfall profits at taxpayers’ 
expense have endured throughout our nation’s history, and were a major factor in the 
Wherry program’s demise.  Similar concerns abound regarding MHPI as well.  However, 
both DoD and Congress have also learned that ‘profit’ is not a profane word, and that 
profit is necessary for a developer’s (and project’s) long-term viability.  Unlike the 
Wherry deals that provided litt le or no developer profits during the early years, MHPI 
contracts are structured to allow developers to earn an agreed upon profit margin 
throughout the project’s life.   
1. Lockbox Concept 
MHPI contracts include “lockbox” provisions to facilitate the accumulation and 
control of project cash flows, limiting the prospects for unreasonably high contractor 
profits and ensuring enough capital remains within the project to maintain it.  All project 
income is deposited into the lockbox account, held by an escrow agent.  Use of the 
lockbox funds is governed by the contractual agreement that sets the application priority 
for these funds.  This cascading cash flow ensures high priority accounts are fully funded 
before money begins flowing into the lower priority accounts.  The general priority order 
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begins with normal operating expenses, followed by debt service, maintenance reserves, 
reinvestments, enhancements and lastly contractor profit.  
The lockbox concept for protecting DoD’s long-term interests is solid, but not 
perfect.  In addition to the agreed upon profits, contractors may also earn additional 
‘profits’ from overpriced service fees paid in the form of normal operating expenses.  
Most contracts include these service fees, labeled daily management and project 
oversight fees, property management incentive fees, and asset management fees, that are 
paid to the developer for services integral to the project’s operation.  The use and price of 
these fees varies significantly from project to project.  While the servic es are generally 
considered necessary to the project’s management and operation, contractors may realize 
outsized profits if the scope and amount of these fees are not appropriately scrutinized 
and priced when negotiating the contracts.  
2. Windfall Profits from BAH Rate Increases 
Since BAH forms the basis for MHPI cash flows, BAH rates are critical for 
project viability.  The first privatization projects, Everett-I and Kingsville-I were 
structured around the previous housing allowance system (BAQ/VHA) and previous rate 
schedules, which did not provide enough cash flow to meet project requirements.  To 
supplement service members’ housing allowances, the Navy used differential lease 
payment (DLP) authority to meet this cash flow gap.  With the exception of Sa n Diego, 
located in an extremely high-cost area, subsequent deals were structured to avoid the 
need for DLP, mainly due to their high budget scores.   
Until announcement of the BAH rate increase in January 2000, housing 
allowances historically covered about 80-85% of total housing costs, with the service 
member paying the remaining 15-20% from other income sources.  As BAH rates 
increase, eliminating out of pocket expenses by 2005, cash flows into MHPI projects will 
increase proportionally.  Based on the historical coverage rate, few within or without 
MHPI projects could have anticipated the BAH increase initiative, and planned for it in 
their MHPI contract agreements.  As a result, contracts for seven of the first ten projects 
(excluding Kingsville-I and Everett-I) did not include specific provisions to limit 
developer profits stemming from the increased rental revenue generated from higher 
BAH rates.  On average, the seven developers receive approximately 28% of the 
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additional revenue, translating to $369 million over the contracts’ life, with Lackland’s 
developer receiving 100% of the additional revenue and Fort Hood’s developer receiving 
only 5%.  (GAO-02-624)  While some may view this condition as a failure to anticipate 
or hedge against future events, other may perceive it as good news, since contractors 
anticipate receiving only 28% of the unforeseen revenue increases, with the remaining 
72% funding reinvestments such as renovations, improvements and expansions.  All 
MHPI contracts now include mechanisms  for capturing increases in project revenues.  
G. PROPERTY TAXES, IMPACT AID AND UTILITY SERVICES  
Property taxes and utility services are implicitly accounted for as part of BAH 
payments to service members residing in private sector housing and payment 
responsibility rests with the property owner.  As discussed in Chapter III however, utility 
service and school impact aid account for a significant portion of traditional MFH and are 
paid by DoD.  Since MHPI is a hybrid between private sector and traditional MFH, its 
treatment of these cost elements is also a hybrid between government, developer and 
tenant responsibility. 
1. Property Taxes and Impact Aid 
Based upon 1950’s lessons where property tax issues finally derailed the 
struggling Wherry program, the DoD policies concerning property taxes and impact aid, 
which encourage early and open negotiations, seem to have been successful in preventing 
disputes between DoD, local governments and contractors.  The seven projects located on 
private land are subject to low-level impact aid and have experienced some civilian 
occupancy.  The seven projects built on government land leased to developers are subject 
to high-level impact aid and have maintained 100% military tenant occupancy.  An issue 
that has not been contested yet is whether DoD is obligated to pay high-level impact aid 
for the children of civilians living in MHPI housing.  Theoretically, since Section 2882, 
(a) and (b), Assignment of Members, have not been used yet to guarantee full occupancy, 
civilian families could rent MHPI units if military family demand is inadequate to fill 
them.  If these civilian-rented units are located on Federal land leased to the MHPI 
developer, and exempt from local property taxes, DoD may become responsible for 
paying high-level impact aid to the local LEA for these civilian families, while 
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simultaneously paying BAH (including implicit property taxes) to a military family 
renting or owning housing in the local market.   
2. Utilities 
Utility services represent a significant component of total housing costs, 
accounting for 10 to 20% of total housing cost in the private sector and about 30% of 
operations and maintenance costs for MFH.  Until the recent BAH rate increase initiative, 
the historical 80-85% housing allowance coverage ratio was generally perceived as 
enough to pay for the housing unit rent, with the service member’s out of pocket 
contribution paying for utilities and renters insurance expenses.  One commonly cited 
advantage of living in military housing is the unlimited provision of utilities by the 
installation, at no expense to the occupants. 
a. DoD Provides MFH Utilities 
DoD’s long-standing policy regarding utility provisions for MFH stems in 
part from concern that charging for utilities places an unfair burden on famili es assigned 
to MFH units that are not well insulated.  To promote conservation, the department relies 
on vigorous public awareness campaigns and installs energy-efficient features in its 
housing.  Nonetheless, DoD MFH utility costs are substantially higher  than equivalent 
private sector utility costs.  Not basing utility charges on usage appears to be a major 
factor in explaining higher MFH costs.  According to some estimates, private sector 
rental unit utility consumption drops 20% when occupants become responsible for their 
own utility costs.  Additionally, most DoD leaders believe that a program to charge MFH 
occupants for utility usage would be negatively received and seen as an erosion of service 
benefits.  (CBO, 1993) 
b. Utility Policy and Legislation Under MHPI 
Fort Carson and Lackland AFB contributed utilities, free of charge to both 
tenants and developers, in their MHPI projects for two reasons.  First, the projects are 
located on Federal land with existing installation utilities service infrastructure.  Second, 
when these two deals were negotiated, tenants’ housing allowances were inadequate to 
pay for all the costs associated with the projects, including utilities.  The Army and Air 
Force chose the free utility provision, which had no budget scoring  impact at the time, 
through the installations’ existing network rather than differential lease payments, or 
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other budget scored authorities, to fill the development gap.  They also avoided making 
utilities a tenant responsibility fearing it would be viewed as benefit erosion, potentially 
reducing occupancy rates and morale.  
Despite DoD policies promoting utility conservation and cost reductions, 
free utility provision to MHPI developers was permissible, without LCC or budget 
scoring impact, until OMB published its scoring guidance in June 1997.  The OMB 
policy now requires that MHPI project scores include the NPV of all estimated utility 
costs over the contract life.  The Carson and Lackland deals gained exemption from the 
scoring rules because they had progressed far enough through the solicitation and 
negotiation process that requiring their compliance would have substantially altered the 
conditions of the deal and necessitated project cancellation and re-start, thereby unduly 
delaying them.  As mentioned earlier, the leverage ratio for both Carson and Lackland 
would have been dramatically lower if utility provisions had been scored in the cases.  
(GAO-02-624)   
In 1999, DoD spent over $2.2 billion buying energy for its installations.  
(Yim, 2000)  Because of its significant expense and government -wide energy 
conservation policies, DoD continually searches for ways to reduce energy costs.  The 
most recent initiatives include a myriad of conservation efforts and plans for the 
privatization of most installation utility services.  Further evidence of DoD’s initiative to 
control and reduce utility costs is evidenced in the addition of Section 2872(a), Utilities 
and Services, to the MHPI authorities as part of the 2001 Defense Authorization Act.  
Section 2872(a) allows service secretaries to provide utilities to MHPI projects, if they 
are located on installation property.  However, the developer must reimburse the 
installation for the utilities, with the reimbursement credited to the installation’s O&M 
account that provides the utilities.  See Appendix B for exact authority language.   
MHPI deals at Fort Hood, MCB Pendleton and NC New Orleans are 
structured under Section 2872(a) authority.  So while the installation provides utility 
services to the project’s tenants, the budget scoring impact is eliminated because the 
developer reimburses the installation for the cost of those utilities.  Also, resulting from 
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this legislation and rising BAH rates, Fort Carson’s developer recently agreed to begin 
reimbursing the installation for utility services provided to the project’s tenants.  
c. Current MHPI Utility Structures 
A basic pillar of the MHPI program, and in conjunction with the BAH rate 
increase initiative, is that MHPI project tenants should pay no out of pocket amounts 
toward either rent or utilities.  MHPI projects accomplish this goal in slightly differing 
ways.  Some deals require tenants to pay utilities directly to the utility provider.  Other 
deals make the developer responsible for utility provider payments.  In  either case, rents 
are set below BAH levels, allowing for a portion of the BAH to cover average utility 
usage.  The utility allowance is set at 110% of the area average monthly utility expense 
over the previous year.  The additional 10% allows room for er ror and inflationary 
pressures, ensuring the allowance is adequate to cover normal utility usage for an average 
military family.  Large military families and those with excessive utility usage may be 
required to pay some out of pocket utility expenses.  
Multiple economic analyses and survey studies indicate that when tenants 
have no financial stake in utility expenses they have no incentive to conserve and act 
accordingly.  However, those same tenants immediately gain concern and take 
appropriate action when they do have a financial stake in utility costs, either through 
direct payments or allowance methods.  Therefore, while DoD still bears most of the 
financial burden and risk of supplying utilities to families living in either MILCON or 
MHPI units, more responsibility for payment and conservation is slowly descending upon 
the service members living in these units.  This positive trend not only mimics the 
responsibility shouldered by those living in private sector housing, but also contributes to 
DoD efforts to control and reduce its utility costs.  
H. TARGET TENANTS AND RETENTION 
Since World War II, enlisted personnel and their importance to the vitality and 
effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces has gained increasing attention among 
Congress and DoD leaders.  Changing service member demographics have also brought 
more attention to the well being of junior and mid -grade enlisted personnel.  The average 
service member is older than before, more likely to be married, more likely to have 
children, more likely to be female, and more likely to be a single parent.  All of these 
76 
factors increase the demand for adequate, affordable housing among the enlisted 
population. 
Installations maintain housing units for all ranks, but since 1949 DoD has 
continually increased its focus on the housing concerns of junior and mid -grade enlisted 
personnel.  Congress first authorized housing allowances for most enlisted personnel in 
1949, expanding the benefit to include dependants in 1973.  Through the 1980s and 
1990s, attention to the housing plight of married junior enlisted personnel, frequently 
with children, gained them access to MFH as well as larger cash allowances for off -base 
living.  Today, pay grades E4 and E5 account for 45% of all service members and E3 
through E6 encompass three-fourths of all service members.  However, their lower pay 
makes them less able to afford civilian housing, especially when they rent units large 
enough to accommodate their growing families. 
1. Target Tenants 
Increased attention among DoD leaders to the concerns of enlisted service 
members and their changing demographic factors result in most MHPI projects being 
focused on providing housing units to junior and mid -grade enlisted personnel.  In his 
1998 policy memo, John Goodman, DUSD for Industrial Affairs and Installations, 
established a MHPI priority for junior enlisted personnel, stating that,  
…projects must specifically identify how the needs for junior enlisted 
personnel (E1-E5) and their families are met at the particular installation.   
If the proposed project is not specifically targeted for junior enlisted 
personnel and their families, then the military department must identify 
and explain how it will use alternative means to address their needs.  
As of 31 December 2001, only six of the fourteen projects included any officer 
housing provisions, with only two projects excluding provisions for E1 -E2 personnel.  
While BAH increases make off base housing more affordable for all ranks, MFH is 
increasingly targeted to satisfy the demands of the most junior personnel, especially those 
with a greater number of dependants.  
Despite higher BAH rates, many junior enlisted personnel will continue 
struggling to meet their housing needs driving the demand for MFH and the need for 
these tenant policies .  This condition is caused by junior enlisted personnel who have 
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more dependants than can be adequately housed within a dwelling of the size and type 
DoD policy sets out for them.  For off base housing, BAH rates for E1 -E5 personnel are 
based on a 2-bedroom apartment, townhouse or duplex, with the E6 rate increasing to a 
3-bedroom unit.  Service members’ family size is only considered when applying for on 
base housing.  Consequently, the “housing gap” between what BAH provides and what 
MFH provides is still significant for many E1-E5 personnel, driving the demand for MFH 
for these individuals.  (GAO-01-508) 
2. Retention 
The link between service members’ housing circumstance (BAH/MFH), 
satisfaction and retention is uncertain.  The HRSO website promotes a pos itive linkage 
arguing that,  
…today’s military members want to live in communities that offer 
stability and continuity of living as a backdrop for deployment, 
reassignment and day-to-day military life.  DoD has found that the 
proportion of personnel remain ing in service from installations with high 
quality housing is about 15 percent higher than among those stationed at 
places with low quality housing.  
Conversely, GAO argues that, “…the retention decision is complicated, highly 
personal, and usually a func tion of many factors.”  Many enlisted personnel who are 
unsatisfied with their housing circumstances still intend to remain in the military for at 
least twenty years.  (GAO-01-684)   
Although not conclusively proven, it seems logical to assume that better housing 
will improve service members’ and their family’s satisfaction with a military lifestyle, 
leading to better work performance and higher retention.  The MHPI supports this 
hypothesis by increasing the quality, availability and affordability of housin g for junior 
and mid-grade enlisted personnel with families.  MHPI investments may serve an 
important role in bolstering retention desires among these junior personnel who are the 
very people that will become the mid -grade and senior leaders on tomorrow’s military 
force.  
I. INSTALLATION POPULATIONS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
Most MHPI projects are located on government land, with many located on and 
integral to the actual installation.  This proximity to critical military functions raises two 
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questions involving both financial and security concerns.  What if the units are no longer 
needed by military families, and what if the demand among military families is 
insufficient to maintain required occupancy levels?  The BAH rate increase initiative 
could negatively impact MHPI occupancy levels if significant numbers of military 
families choose to rent or own housing in the local community rather than live in MHPI 
units.  Conversely, terrorist activities directed against United States military personnel 
and other government employees may increase the demand for on base housing, with 
service members and their families preferring the increased security of installation 
housing behind guarded gates.  
1. Downsizing, Deployment and BRAC 
The number of service members, and families eligible for and requiring military 
housing, stationed at a particular installation is paramount to the success of MHPI 
projects.  The effects of a base closure or substantial downsizing are obvious, reducing 
the tenant base and the occupancy level of an MHPI project, placing it in jeopardy of 
financial failure.  Even deployments of significant size or duration may financially stress 
a privatized project if large numbers of military families vacate the installation while 
service members are deployed,  as happened at many CONUS posts during the Persian 
Gulf War.   
To relieve MHPI developers of this potential and unpredictable risk, Fort Carson 
and three Air Force projects included limited loan guarantees, which improve the 
availability of private financ ing or assist the developers in obtaining lower interest rates 
from first mortgage lenders.  The limited guarantee protects the first mortgage lender 
against mortgage default only, due to loss of tenants caused by base closure, downsizing, 
or extended deployment.  The guarantees carry a low budget score, and only result in 
Government financial obligations when the developer demonstrates that loan default was 
directly caused by vacancy created by the number of eligible military families falling 
below a predetermined threshold.  The threshold rate for each limited loan guarantee is 
individually negotiated depending upon each project’s unique circumstances.  
For the purpose of limited loan guarantees, the term ‘eligible military families’ is 
defined as the number of military personnel with families assigned to an installation who 
are eligible to live in MHPI units.  The number of eligible military families is the actual 
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number of personnel (with families) assigned to the installation, reduced by the number 
of eligible military personnel deployed for a period of at least 150 days.  
2. Force Protection and Installation Security 
Privatization agreements allow for civilians to rent housing units if they are not 
rented by military families.  Long-term agreements and the inherent errors associated 
with long-term estimates increase the potential that at least some civilians will eventually 
live in MHPI units.  Several potential problems arise from the possibility of civilians 
living on military installations.  Would maintaining installation security become more 
difficult and more expensive with a larger population entering and exiting the installation 
daily, and what control, if any, might the installation exercise over the renting policies of 
developers?  Who would pay for and be responsible for civilian tenant security 
background checks?  Could the civilian tenant move into an MHPI unit while pending a 
background check, and if not, who would absorb the rental losses during the waiting 
period?  Would breaking the tradition of exclusive military community with civilian 
tenants negatively affect morale?  The issue of impact aid payments for children of 
civilian MHPI tenants was discussed earlier.  Finally, how would law enforcement 
responsibilities be delineated between local community and military police in cases 
involving on base civilian tenants? 
3. Vacancy Solutions 
First, the Air Force clearly does not want civilians living in installation MHPI 
units, and its ‘severability’ criterion is specifically designed to prevent this from 
occurring.  The Army’s whole -base MHPI concept may present challenges with 
unsustainably high MHPI vacancy rates requiring adjustments to the project’s 
agreements.  Although it is currently undesirable due to its high budget scoring effect, 
Section 2882, (a) and (b), Assignment of Members (tenant guarantee) could support 
required occupancy levels during downsizing, deployments, or low demand by military 
families.  Renegotiating MHPI agreements to including this provision ensures high 
occupancy rates and avoids the potential concerns of civilians living on military 
installations, but runs counter to DoD’s stated policy of relying first on the local real 
estate market for housing military families.  Making vacant MHPI units available to DoD 
civilian workers may solve the problem but may also create fairness issues with the local 
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non-government civilian population, and does not solve the school impact aid problem.  
The policing and handling of crimes committed by civilian tenants on installations is no 
more complicated than the current situation where military and civilian law enforcement 
work together and frequently operate liaison departments affecting the scores of civilians 
working on and around military installations.  Finally, decreased access to and  increased 
security presence at installations, resulting from recent world wide terrorism events, may 
alleviate concerns about civilians living in MHPI units.   
J. OTHER MHPI PROVISIONS AND ISSUES  
1. Long-Term Contracts 
Both critics and advocates frequently cite contract lengths in their arguments.  
With the exception of early projects at Kingsville -I and Everett-I, MHPI contract lengths 
are 30 to 50 years in length.  Three projects also incorporate additional option years.  
Kingsville-II has a 15-year base contract, with a 15-year option, and Carson and Hood 
both have 50-year base contracts with 25-year options.   
Critics, such as GAO and CNA, raise several risk factors associated with long -
term contracts.  When rents are fixed, as they are tied to BAH rate s in MHPI projects, 
contractors may have little economic incentive to properly maintain the units.  The 
contractor may increase profits through cost cutting measures by limiting maintenance, 
hiring less-qualified managers and staff, or using inferior construction and repair 
materials.  Maintenance and repair short cuts may become especially tempting near the 
end of the contract life when developers may try to drain the maximum possible 
economic benefit from the property before it reverts to government owner ship.  While 
MHPI agreements contain maintenance standards, modernization schedules, escrow 
accounts and oversight safeguards, enforcing these provisions could become difficult, 
time consuming and costly, with minimal effectiveness.  (GAO -98-178) 
An additional concern of long-term privatization agreements is whether the 
housing will be needed over the life of the project.  Since housing needs forecasts beyond 
three to five years are inaccurate, the risk substantially increases that DoD may not need 
the hous ing units over the entire period.  This raises the prospect of DoD being 
financially responsible for housing it does not need, renting to civilians, or requiring 
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service members to live in the MHPI units rather than allowing their choice.  (GAO -98-
178) 
DoD contends that long-term contracts are necessary to attract and maintain a 
contractor committed to the agreement’s long-term health, and are in keeping with the 
concept of fostering acquisition partners, rather than the traditional government -
contractor, us-and-them relationships.  Shorter-term contracts promote a “take the money 
and run” attitude among contractors, and increase the administrative overhead and 
transitional lapses associated with frequent contractor turbulence.  Raymond Dubois, 
DUSD (I&E) also added that longer-term ground leases and contracts enhance project 
financing options and quality by lengthening loan repayment periods, which allow project 
revenues to better meet debt service requirements.  (Dubois, 2002)  
DoD counters that installations only build to satisfy 90% of their MFH 
requirement to reduce the risk of maintaining excess units, and that multiple provisions 
are included in MHPI contracts to protect the quality of life of those service members 
residing in MHPI units.  Cash flows cas cade down the priority waterfall reaching the 
profit pool lastly, and the equity investments and partnership agreements give service 
officials adequate leverage to ensure investment and management decisions are in the 
best interests of the government, the installations and the service families.  Ultimately, 
contract termination is available if contractor performance is deemed unacceptable.  
Yearly tenant surveys are largely responsible for grading the contractor’s performance 
and the overall quality of living conditions.  
2. Late Rent Payments 
Four MHPI agreements (Carson, Lackland, Elmendorf and Hood) use Section 
2882(c), Payment by Allotment authority, requiring military tenants to pay their rent to 
MHPI developers in the form of allotments from their perio dic pay.  Payment by 
allotment provides the developer with a stable revenue stream that is paid in arrears on 
the first of every month, unlike typical revenue streams based on rental payments found 
in the private sector.  The ability of the developer to an ticipate collection of rents without 
the variability associated with delinquent or insufficient payments provides added 
comfort to the developer and lender without additional costs to the Government, in terms 
of either dollars or budget impact.  (PEP, 2001) 
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Nine of the first thirteen MHPI projects elected not to use this authority, which 
has resulted in significant non-payment of the final month’s rent by tenants vacating the 
units.  Because of the contract structures, this lost money is not a financial sac rifice for 
most of these developers, but rather represents funds that should be flowing into 
reinvestment accounts.  Since the lost cash flow represents a decrement to future project 
renovations and enhancements, and has no budget scoring impact, the HRSO has strongly 
recommended that all future projects eliminate non-payment problems by incorporating 
payment by allotment authority into their contracts.  (PEP, 2001)  
3. Installation Provided Services 
About one-half of the MHPI projects obtain police and fire protection services 
from the existing installation support organizations.  These projects are located on land 
leased from DoD with housing communities that are either an integral part of or 
immediately adjacent to the installation.  These support service provisions provide 
immediate cash flow to the developer by reducing operational costs (given that certain 
local taxes are not applicable) and reduce infrastructure costs.  BAH cash flows service 
other projects needs, rather than paying for police and fire salaries and equipment, and 
the need to construct high-cost police and fire station houses is eliminated.  Similar to 
utility services in the early projects, fire and police provisions are not budget scored, 
adding to an MHPI project’s budget attractivenes s.  Mr. Sikes’ LCC policy does not 
address the treatment of police and fire protection services.  MHPI projects not receiving 
police and fire protection services from the installation, but relying on the local civilian 
community for these services, tend to be the smaller projects, located on private land and 
physically detached from the main installation. 
4. Military Tenant Out-of-Pocket Expenses 
All awarded projects have planned zero OOP expenses for their military tenants.  
Increasing BAH rates facilitated this for more recent projects.  Earlier projects, like 
Kingsville-I and Everett-I required differential lease payments to supplement BAH rates 
to keep OOP expense at zero for all occupants.  At these earlier projects, military 
occupancy was lower than anticipated, augmented by civilian tenants, and military tenant 
profiles were different than targeted due to significant OOP expenses experienced by 
their intended junior enlisted tenants.  Although intended for junior and mid -grade (E4-
83 
E6) enlisted families , Kingsville-I actually included 21% officers, 18% civilians, and 
19% vacancies in January 1998, primarily because OOP expenses averaged almost $200 
per month.  Military occupancy and tenant profiles became more favorable after 
instituting differential lease payments.  San Diego also used DLP authority because BAH 
has not yet increased enough to cover all associated developer costs and utilities 
allowances.  As discussed earlier, only those tenants with excessive utility usage should 
experience any OOP expenses while living in MHPI units. 
5. Occupancy Rates 
Thus far, MHPI overall occupancy rates and occupancy by military families has 
remained at nearly 100%.  Only the Kingsville -I project experienced significant vacancy 
or civilian occupancy, primarily due to excessive OOP expenses borne by the targeted 
enlisted families.  Differential lease payments and higher BAH rates gradually corrected 
this weakness.  The Kingsville -I project demonstrates the flexibility MHPI provides with 
civilian tenants temporarily filling vacancies maintaining the project’s financial viability.  
6. Physical Assessment Report  
The Services are developing standard tenant surveys, to be conducted yearly, 
which will in large part measure the effectiveness of the project’s operations and 
management functions.  To help ensure tenant satisfaction, many of the individual project 
contracts have either built in performance incentives for operations and management or 
have the ability to force the replacement of an unsatisfactory property management 
organization.  Thus far, initial tenant feedback from physical assessment reports is 
positive, with three projects (Lackland, Dyess, Kingsville -II) earning an ‘excellent’ 
rating.  Ten projects earned ‘good’ ratings, no projects earned a ‘poor’ rating, and  only 
Hood earned a ‘fair’ rating.  The ‘fair’ rating at Hood was primarily attributed to 
disappointed tenants who moved into units that were conveyed to the developer but had 
not yet been renovated.  
K. SERVICE COMPONENT KEYSTONES  
1. Air Force - Severability 
The Air Force intends to primarily use MHPI to supplement their traditional MFH 
operations in areas with strong real estate markets where the MHPI developments are 
kept distinctly separate from the core installation.  This balanced approach, combining 
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BAH, MILCON and MHPI, provides the most flexibility and hedges against future 
uncertainties.   Severable MHPI projects facilitate civilian occupancy without interfering 
with base security concerns, and the robust real estate markets provide an adequate poo l 
of potential civilian tenants.  Reasonable prospects for civilian occupancy greatly reduces 
the Air Force’s potential liabilities to the projects if installations are closed or downsized, 
or if increasing BAH rates, as predicted, dramatically decrease the demand for MFH 
among military families.  The obvious disadvantage of the Air Force approach is the 
reliance on traditional MILCON appropriations to revitalize and maintain its MFH 
inventory.  These MILCON funds may not materialize in adequate supply to accomplish 
the necessary revitalizations or may require extended timelines to do it.   
2. Army - RFQ Source Selection and Whole Base Concept  
The Army feels its RFQ process is consistent with ongoing acquisition 
streamlining and business partnering initiativ es, resulting in solicitations that are both 
more efficient and more effective.  It is more efficient because developers do not have to 
spend the time and money to draw up detailed architectural designs knowing they may 
not win the contract award.  The Army also believes more firms can compete for the 
contract because an RFQ is easier and less costly to develop.  It is more effective; more 
likely to meet Army needs since the Army is intimately involved in the detailed design 
planning, maximizing opportunities for interchange while fostering innovation and taking 
advantage of private sector design expertise.   
Critics contend that the RFQ process limits competition to only those very large 
development firms who have previous experience with large housing comm unities, 
squeezing out smaller firms who may have better concepts and designs.  They also 
believe source selection, based on an RFQ, is too subjective for a contract encompassing 
basic construction and property management, neither of which are new or uniqu e.  Still 
others argue that selecting a contractor based only on an RFQ severely limits the Army’s 
ability to obtain a best value deal through competition because competition is eliminated 
before the detailed plans are completed. 
The whole-base concept fos ters service families’ emotional loyalty and 
commitment to the installation and the Army by touching every aspect of their daily life 
and leaving a positive impression upon it.  Former Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera 
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once stated, “We recruit soldiers, but we retain families.”  (Apgar, 2000)  This quote 
reflects the Army’s view that military career decisions are total family decisions and that 
families make these decisions based extensively on their perceived quality of life.  The 
whole-base concept represents the Army’s belief that quality of life can be sustained and 
improved by privatizing entire bases and creating close-knit livable communities where 
military families have access to the various types of housing, amenities and support 
services that mos t civilians enjoy in their neighborhoods.  The Army’s MHPI developers 
become community managers, responsible for researching and responding to families’ 
needs over the long-term, not just property managers responsible for assignments and 
maintenance of housing units.  The whole-base concept also promotes operating 
efficiency by consolidating an entire installation’s housing functions under a single prime 
contractor. 
3. Navy - PPV 
When compared to the Air Force and Army approaches to MHPI, the Navy’s 
approac h, using public -private ventures, requires more financial investment and 
commitment at project inception with higher budget scores, but provides greater Navy 
involvement and control over the project and offers the potential of some equity returns 
in the out years.  Investment authority through PPVs provides the Navy with the 
flexibility and maximum management control over the project, including input into key 
decisions such as the sale of assets from the project, the incurring of new debt, the use of 
maintenance or reinvestment funds, while preserving limited liability and avoiding 
responsibility for day-to-day operations.  The Navy says that PPV enable it to participate 
in the projects upsides, and accordingly, reinvest those returns, as needed, to insure t hat 
the units are well operated and maintained for the benefit of the Navy families throughout 
the term of the agreement. 
L. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
While it falls short of absolute privatization under a completely free market 
system, MHPI moves DoD closer to the intent outlined in OMB Circular A-76 and meets 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 2 guidance in not qualifying as an inherent 
governmental function.  The MHPI program is a positive step to reduce the cost of 
defense infrastructure and improve the quality of life for its service members.  The BAH 
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rate increase initiative is both a boon to MHPI financial feasibility but may also cause a 
reduced need for military family housing.  Although MHPI benefits from previous 
housing privatization lessons learned it is  still partially held hostage by budget scoring 
and internal government critics.  It is a complicated, dynamic program with a short 
history and a long list of questions and issues that will ultimately determine its historical 
rank ordering along side the Wherry, Capehart, and Sections 801 and 802 programs.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During Congressional testimony on 13 March 2002, Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD 
for Installations and Environment, explained the urgent need to improve militar y family 
housing conditions saying,  
We’re competing with the private sector for the best young people in our 
country.  We can’t simply count on their patriotism and their willingness 
to sacrifice alone.  Sustaining the quality of life of our people is crucial to 
recruiting, crucial to retention, and especially crucial to our readiness to 
fight. 
Clearly, quality of life and its connection to recruitment, retention and force 
readiness, and the effect housing conditions have on quality of life, are major conc erns 
within DoD.  While most agree that adequate, affordable housing contributes to the 
betterment of service members, their families, and ultimately to DoD, many disagree on 
the best method to obtain and provide this housing to service members.  
B. MILCON 
1. Conclusions 
Although MILCON has been the primary method of obtaining on -base MFH for 
over fifty years, its funding levels have consistently fallen short of DoD’s construction, 
renovation and operations needs, perpetuating the inadequate housing problem.   Given 
current Federal budget pressures and those projected in the future, it is unlikely that 
MILCON will ever solve the MFH problem.  However, Congress still views MILCON as 
the primary method for constructing, renovating and operating on -base housing, but is 
unlikely to fully relinquish the budgetary control associated with it.  
2. Recommendations 
Recognizing that Congress prefers MILCON to MHPI, DoD should continue 
using MILCON to the maximum practicable extent, while gradually decreasing its 
reliance on it.  MILCON is best suited for planned renovations of existing on -base units 
or construction of new on-base units only when a weak or non-existent local housing 
market renders MHPI or private-sector housing unviable.  DoD could reduce MILCON 
costs by building to commercial standards and using a private contractor to operate and 
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Housing Allowances, specifically BAH rates, are the clearly the central variable 
in the demand/supply equation for housing service members and their families.  Lower 
allowances, requiring significant out-of-pocket expenditures for those living off base, and 
free utilities on base caused the historically strong demand for on-base housing.  By 
2005, the BAH rate increase initiative will eliminate this variable and the associated cost 
disparity between private sector housing and MFH.  While each installation’s local 
economy and private sector housing market is unique, higher BAH rates will decrease the 
demand and need for MFH by making rental and ownership in the local market more 
feasible for service families, and by attracting private housing investment from non -
military individuals.  However, increased availa bility and usage of private sector housing 
resulting from higher BAH rates may not materialize for several more years because of 
the culture of ‘government housing’ and historical presence of large MFH stocks.  
BAH is also the single most important factor in MHPI deals for two reasons.  
First, it is not budget scored, thereby increasing the attractiveness of the Government’s 
funding profile for MHPI projects and making them more palatable for Congressional 
approval.  Second, it provides most of the cash flow ing into an MHPI project.  Increasing 
these cash inflows attracts more developers to MHPI projects, increasing competition and 
quality, and reducing costs.  Increasing BAH rates also reduces the need for other forms 
of Governmental financial participation such as equity investments and direct loans that 
increase government risk and exposure to loses.  
2. Recommendations 
DoD should ensure the success of the BAH rate increase initiative to obtain and 
maintain BAH rates at 100% of total housing costs.  Over tim e, BAH rate increases can 
be partially offset by cost savings resulting from a reduced reliance on and a partial 
divestiture of the more costly MHPI and MILCON programs.  
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Service components and individual installations must ensure that MHPI deals 
have adequate measures to ensure appropriate capture, use and control over excess cash 
inflows resulting from increasing BAH rates. 
D. MHPI 
1. Conclusions 
MHPI provides a flexible, achievable and appropriate bridge between private 
sector housing and traditional MILCON housing.  Although few MHPI projects are 
completed, little historical data is available for collection and analysis, and many control 
and evaluation processes are still under development and refinement, it seems that MHPI 
is meeting its objective of solving the military housing problem.  MHPI’s most attractive 
feature is its ability to construct and renovate housing units significantly faster than 
traditional MILCON funded methods could.  Projections indicate that MHPI costs about 
10% less than traditional MFH funded by MILCON appropriations but is still more costly 
than private sector housing funded by housing allowances, and accurate long -term LCC 
estimates are fraught with interpretations and assumptions.  MHPI projects also provide 
housing comparable to the local private housing market rather than the one-size-fits-all 
units typical of traditional MFH.  Through HRSO oversight and inter -service 
cooperation, many lessons learned from earlier MHPI projects and lessons from the 
Wherry, Capehart and Section 801/802 programs have also been incorporated into the 
MHPI deals structures.   
2. Recommendations 
DoD should not base any project decisions on the anticipation that MHPI will be 
less costly than traditional MFH since cost growth is far more prevalent in Government 
operations than savings realizations. 
DoD should use MHPI to bridge the gap between traditional MFH funded by 
MILCON and private sector housing funded by BAH.  It is best suited for constructing 
and renovating units when sufficient MILCON funding is not available and should be 
targeted for installations in robust real estate markets that can absorb the MHPI units if 




E.  BUDGET SCORING 
1. Conclusions 
Budget scoring has a significant impact on decisions surrounding the housing 
issue, especially those decisions concerning the use or non -use of the MHPI authorities 
and to what degree those authorities are used. 
As more MHPI units become available and occupied by service families, 
budgetary requirements and cash flows will shift from the MILCON-O&M accounts to 
the Military Personnel (BAH) accounts which may cause increased Congressional 
interest in BAH, likely resulting in increased Congressional control and oversight since 
BAH is essentially an entitlement to all service members with dependants.  
2. Recommendations 
DoD and the services must continue to carefully evaluate and improve the MHPI 
project decision criterion to ensure that individual MHPI deals are not only affordable 
under budget scoring rules but are also financially sensible in the long term. 
F. UTILITY SERVICES  
1. Conclusions 
Utilities are a significant cost component to providing MFH either through 
MILCON or MHPI, and have historically represented the out -of-pocket cost difference 
between private sector housing and MFH.  Tenants tend to have little regard for 
conservation and consume more utilities when they are provided free of charge.  
Conversely, consumption decreases and conservation concerns increase when tenants pay 
their own utility costs.  While the utility allowance method helps prevent excessive use, it 
does not promote true conservation because tenants do not financially benefit from 
extraordinary conservation efforts.  
2. Recommendations 
Tenants of both MHPI and traditional MFH should be directly financially 
responsible for their utility costs.  While the allowance system is acceptable where 
individual unit metering is not available, direct payment to the utility provider is the 
preferred method where metering is available and should be incorp orated into all new and 





Initial survey results indicate tenants are happy with MHPI, seeing it as a vast 
improvement over the MILCON alternatives.  Service members are also pleased with the 
BAH rate increases which broaden their housing choices.  While difficult to measure or 
quantify, choice increases career satisfaction and retention.  Whether it is a choice of duty 
station, military occupational specialty (MOS), reenlistment bonuses or housing, service 
members respond positively to choices.   
Service members’ retention decisions are increasingly based on overall career 
satisfaction, including family members’ satisfaction with the prospects of a military 
spouse or parent.  Since housing conditions are closely t ied to service member and family 
members’ satisfaction with a military lifestyle, improving housing through BAH and 
MHPI will inevitably lead to higher retention. 
2. Recommendations 
DoD should use the housing improvements as quality of life advertising mat erial 
for its recruitment and retention programs, reducing recruitment and retention costs and 
improving effectiveness resulting from increased force continuity.  
H. FAMILY AND INSTALLATION SECURITY 
1. Conclusions 
The new terrorism environment will increasingly impact housing decisions, from 
both a family security perspective and an installation security perspective.  More service 
members may pursue on base housing to promote family security and installations will be 
less amicable to civilian occupants in MHPI units. 
2. Recommendations 
Due to costs and time constraints, DoD should structure MHPI deals to avoid 
occupancy by any individuals who do not already possess an adequate background 
security clearance.  No tenant should be allowed to rent or occupy on -base MHPI units 
until appropriate security checks are completed.  Having at least a portion of the 
installation’s family housing stock as severable ensures that potential civilian occupants 
could be directed to the severable units with military families living in the non-severable 
units of an MHPI project.  
92 
I. SERVICE COMPONENT APPROACHES TO MHPI 
1. Conclusions 
Consistent with military tradition and happenstance, each of the three Service 
components has once again embarked upon their own unique approaches to solving 
similar problems.  The Air Force’s balanced approach between MILCON and MHPI and 
their severability criterion, the Army’s whole -base concept and RFQ solicitation process, 
and the Navy’s PPV approach demonstrate the flexibility build into the MHPI au thorities 
and the program’s current structure.  This flexibility allows each service and installation 
to pursue MHPI agreements that fit their unique cultures and circumstances and avoids 
the pitfalls of a one-size-fits-all approach. 
2. Recommendations 
Maintain the current MHPI program structure allowing the services and 
installations to pursue housing solutions based on their own unique cultures and 
circumstances, while using the HRSO to promote information sharing, and to provide 
guidance, oversight and a conduit to and from OSD and Congress. 
DoD must guard against overbuilding and civilian occupancy by fully considering 
the long-term impact of rising BAH rates.  Even though DoD’s stated policy is to build 
only 90% of its MFH requirement, every installatio n, as part of its construction and/or 
renovation request, should commission an economic study to estimate the increased 
private sector housing availability that may likely materialize over the next ten years 
resulting from the BAH rate increases.  
The Air Force’s Severability criterion should be a component of most MHPI 
projects.  Based on the study of the local real estate market, installations should ensure 
that at least an appropriate portion of the total MHPI project is severable to prevent the 
need for civilians (requiring background checks and potentially creating security 
trepidation) from potentially renting MHPI units if service member demand is inadequate 
and if budget scoring prevents the use of “assignment of members” authority.  Even the 
Army’s whole-base concept could accommodate this approach by building a portion of 
its MHPI units on the periphery of the post.  
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While the Navy’s PPV approach promotes increased service oversight, DoD 
should also guard against excessive involvement in privatization  efforts that may 
compromise the beneficial affects of privatization. 
J. HOUSING REFERRAL OFFICE 
1. Conclusions 
Installation housing referral offices have primarily focused on managing the 
waiting and assignment of willing service families to traditional MFH, while information 
and services concerning the local private sector housing market has been mostly cursory.  
Improving service families’ ability to make appropriate housing decisions will reduce the 
need and demand for government sponsored housing through either the MILCON or 
MHPI programs, and allow for greater reliance on private sector housing markets 
without. 
2. Recommendations 
DoD, the service components, and installations should change the face of 
installation housing offices.  They should move away from assignment, maintenance and 
inspections and gravitate toward referrals, counseling, and consumer information based 
operations.  Robust manning of housing offices and associated referral services, including 
financial counseling, rental and purchase pricing, crime statistics, property tax and 
insurance data, and historical customer satisfaction surveys promote knowledgeable 
decisions by service families.  Ultimately, the goal is to help an inexperienced military 
family make an informed, intelligent housing decision.   
K. RESEARCH QUESTION ANSWERS 
1. Primary Research Question  
How might the Department of Defense best use its various housing programs to 
solve its military family housing problem to ensure its service families are adequately 
housed? 
DoD is using all three methods (BAH, MILCON, MHPI) at its disposal to 
eliminate the problem of inadequate military family housing, but each service component 
and installation has the flexibility to choose the method, or mixture of methods that best 
suit its circumstances.  Since each service component and installation have unique service 
member cultures and localized housing markets, the mixture and flexibility allowed by 
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the Department, coupled with HRSO coordination and oversight provides the optimum 
housing solution.  Maximum long-term efficiencies and minimum government financial 
risk could be obtained by gradually reducing the MILCON and MHPI housing stocks and 
replacing these reductions with a greater reliance on the private -sector housing market 
(BAH) by service member families. 
2. Secondary Research Questions  
· What methods for providing military family housing are available to the 
Defense Department?  Traditional military construction (MILCON), 
Military Housing privatization Initiative (MHPI) and reliance on t he 
private sector housing market (BAH). 
· What housing methods do service members prefer and what factors 
influence their choice?  Approximately 75% of all service members prefer 
civilian housing obtained in the private sector market and funded by BAH, 
primarily because the traditional MILCON housing is smaller, older, has 
fewer amenities and is generally run-down compared to the civilian 
housing they can obtain with BAH.  Junior-ranking personnel, those with 
non-working spouses, and those with larger familie s seek traditional 
MILCON housing primarily because it is larger and less expensive than 
the housing they could otherwise afford and obtain in the local private 
sector housing market.  
· What is the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI), and what a re 
the program’s goals?  The primary goal of the MHPI is to fill the gap left 
between MILCON family housing and the private sector housing market 
(BAH) by quickly constructing and renovating family housing units at a 
pace three to five times faster than could be accomplished through 
traditional MILCON appropriations alone.  
· What impact does “budget scoring” have on MHPI decisions and deals?  
Budget scoring has an enormous impact on virtually all aspects in the 
process of deciding upon and then crafting an MHPI agreement.  MHPI 
authorities with little or no budget scoring impact are heavily favored over 
those authorities with higher scores.  BAH is not budget scored, but 
scoring it would cause the demise of any further MHPI projects.  
· What impact does BAH have on the need for MFH and the prospects for 
MHPI?  Near most installations, the BAH rate increase initiative should 
eventually make more private sector housing available to and affordable 
for military families which will decrease the demand and need for MFH.   
Rising BAH rates make MHPI more lucrative for developers and decrease 
the governments need to use other authorities such as direct loans or 
equity investments to fill the development gap in MHPI deals.  The BAH 
rate increases necessary to spur private sector housing market expansion 
near installations in desolate locations or tightly constricted real estate 
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markets will likely be prohibitively expensive, continuing the need for 
either MILCON or MHPI family housing projects.  
· What impact will MHPI likely have on the closed military community 
concept, retention rates, and family security?  Although difficult to 
measure and quantify, better housing conditions, regardless of how they 
are obtained, will at least marginally improve retention rates and service 
family satisfaction.  If service family occupancy decreases in off base 
MHPI projects, civilian tenants will be readily welcomed and integrated to 
fill the vacancies.  However, because of security concerns and to preserve 
the concept and culture of the military installation, service leaders and 
installation commanders are unlikely to allow meaningful civilian 
occupancy of on base MHPI projects.  They will find creative methods to 
persuade service members to accept the on base units, exercise 
severability clauses, push for Wherry-type acquisitions, or request 
assignment of members authority. 
· What impact will MHPI have on DoD utility expenses?  While much 
remains to be done, MHPI is gradually placing greater financial and 
conservation responsibility for utility payments on service members, 
which reduces DoD utility expenses by placing the burden of excessive 
use on the shoulders of the tenants. 
L. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
· Determine the requirements for MFH.  How much MFH do we really 
need?  What installations have adequate real estate markets to absorb more 
military families and where is MFH still needed?   
· What is the net impact of higher BAH rates.  Has it increased the supply 
and adequacy of private sector housing and reduced the need for MFH?  
· Follow-up to gauge the success failure of MHPI or individual MHPI 
projects judging customer satisfaction, costs and control issues.  
· Will the Navy’s PPV actually see any long term costs savings, increased 
control or other benefits resulting from its higher initial investments? 
· How has terrorism affected service members’ preferences for on -
installation MFH and installation leaders’ preference for MHPI? 
· What will DoD (primarily the Army) do with section 801 housing when 
the leases expire, mostly in 2007 and 2008?  How do the his torical costs of 
these projects compare to their initial estimates or to comparable 
MILCON projects? 






M. FINAL THOUGHT 
Whether providing a product or service by a government agency, through a 
government agency or for a government agency, the historical costs are consistently 
higher than estimated at project inception.  Government is consistently criticized for 
being inefficient and more costly than private industry.  With this  in mind, DoD should 
quantify its primary concern regarding MFH.  If the concern is to provide government -
sponsored housing, and to upgrade its government sponsored housing quickly, then 
MHPI is the best way to do it.  Although it may be estimated to cost less at project 
inception, the costs will likely grown as costs have almost always done under other 
government contracts and projects.  However, MHPI holds the promise of rapidly 
upgrading all inadequate MFH and eliminating housing deficits within the next six years. 
If DoD’s primary concern is cost control, while still maintaining the traditional 
MFH inventory, it should consider building and renovating MFH under MILCON and 
using a contractor for maintenance and management services.  
If DoD’s concern is to ensure its service families live in housing considered 
adequate for their rank and family size, at most installations its least costly method is the 
private sector housing market, funded through BAH.  This allows SMs to make their own 
housing decisions, providing choice, rather than being assigned to a MFH unit or 
community.  Purchases, rentals, maintenance and management is subject to market forces 
and market efficiencies.  Working with area chambers of commerce and business 
associations will encourage investment, and allow DoD to gradually divest installations 
of MILCON units over the next twenty years or so, giving the market adequate time to 
adjust. 
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APPENDIX A.  DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACRS Accelerated Cost Recovery System.  An IRS provision 
that allows private firms to accelerated depreciation 
deductions on tangible assets for tax purposes.  ACRS 
rates are based on the useful life of the asset class and 
produce higher depreciation expenses in earlier years 
when compared to other depreciation methodologies.  
Under ACRS, full asset depreciation is accomplished in 
50-75% of the time and is significantly skewed toward 
the early years of asset life, when compared to the 
straight-line method.  ACRS was introduced in 1980, 
and modified in 1987, as an inducement to promote 
business capital investment.  
 
Appropriations As a type of budget authority, permit you to incur 
obligations and make outlays (payments) for a given 
purpose.  Not all appropriations provide budget 
authority.  Congress enacts appropriations in annual 
appropriations acts and other laws.  (OMB Circular A-
11) 
 
Base Loading Refers to the number of military service members 
assigned to units stationed at a particular installation.  It 
may refer to the absolute number of service members 
assigned to an installation, or be expressed as a 
percentage of the total population (including all military 
and civilians) living within the installation’s 
geographical area.  
 
Basic Allowance for Housing BAH.  Replaces the old BAQ/VHA system. 
 
Capital Lease Any lease other than a lease-purchase that does not 
meet the criteria of an operating lease.  (OMB, A-11) 
 
Davis-Bacon Act 
(40 U.S.C. 276a-276a-7) The Act provides that contracts in excess of $2,000 to 
which the United States or the District of Columbia is a 
party for construction, alteration, or repair (including 
painting and decorating) of public buildings or public 
works within the United States, shall contain a clause 
that no laborer or mechanic employed directly upon the 
site of the work shall receive less than the prevailing 
wage rates as determined by the Secretary of Labor.  
(FAR, Part 22) 
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Force Alignment Refers to the number and type of military units assigned 
to an installation. 
 
KTR Contractor, hired to provide a good or service to the 
government. 
 
Lease-Purchase A type of lease in which ownership of the asset is 
transferred to the Government at or shortly after the end 
of the lease term.  Such a lease may or may not contain 
a bargain-price purchase option.  (OMB, A-11) 
 
Life Cycle Cost LCC.  The total cos t to the government of acquisition 
and ownership of that system over its useful life.  It 
includes the cost of development, acquisition, 
operations, and support (to include manpower), and 
where applicable, disposal.   
 
Maintenance Rent The proportion or dollar value of periodic rent payment 
that covers the operations and maintenance costs of a 
housing project after construction is completed. 
 
MFH Military Family Housing.  Housing units provided 
specifically for military family occupancy, including 
units obtained under section 801/802, and units owned 
and operated by DoD and funded through MILCON 
appropriations. 
 
MHO Military Housing Office.  Located at a military 
installation, a housing referral office that both assigns 
people to MFH units and offers limited advice to 
service members regarding the local private housing 
market. 
 
MILCON Military Construction.  Appropriations funding for 
major projects such as bases, schools, missile storage 
facilities, maintenance facilities, medical/dental clinics, 
libraries, and military family housing.  MILCON 
appropriations fund most major renovations and new 
construction of MFH, through specific MFH 
appropriations, separate from other MILCON 
appropriations. 
 
NPV Net Present Value. 
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Shelter Rent The proportion or dollar value of periodic rent 
payments adequate to amortize the construction costs of 
a housing project over its useful life, or the duration of 
the mortgage.  
 
Operating Lease Any lease that meets ALL four of the following criteria.  
(OMB, A-11) 
 
(1) Ownership of the asset remains with the lessor 
during the term of the lease and is not 
transferred to the Government at or shortly after 
the end of the lease term.  
(2) The lease does not contain a bargain -price 
purchase option. 
(3) The lease term does not exceed 75% of the 
estimated economic life of the asset. 
(4) The present value of the minimum lease 
payments over the life of the lease does not 
exceed 90% of the fair market value of the asset 
at the beginning of the lease term. 
 
Operations and Maintenance O&M.  Money from this appropriation funds the day-
to-day operations of MFH including all minor repairs, 
most major repairs and occasionally a small portion of 
major renovations.  
 
Out of Pocket Expenses  OOP.  The portion of a service member’s housing 
expense that is not covered by BAH, are borne by the 
service member, and usually considered paid from 
after-tax base pay. 
 
Privatized Housing Housing units made available for rent to military 
families under the Military Housing Privatization 
Initiative.   
 
PSH.  Private Sector  Housing Also called Civilian Housing.  Housing units, located 
on private land, owned and operated by private entities, 
available to the general population, either military or 
civilian, for rental or ownership.   
 
Utilities Periodic and recurring expenses associated with 
operating a household including electricity, heat, water, 
sewer, and refuse removal.  Does not include telephone, 
cable TV or Internet service provider costs, which are 
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APPENDIX B.  1996 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
1996 Defense Authorization Act 
 
Public Law 104-106 110 Stat 186 
Signed by President Clinton on Saturday, February 10, 1996.  
 
One Hundred Fourth Congress 
of the  
United States of America 
At the Second Session 
 
Begun and held at the City of Washington 
on Wednesday, the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety -six 
S1124 
Thurmond S. (R-SC), 01/26/96, (32488 lines) 




To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for military activities of the Department 
of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of 
Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forc es, to 
reform acquisition laws and information technology management of the Federal 
Government, and for other purposes.  
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled,  
 
TITLE XXVIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS   
SUBTITLE A--MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE  
 
SEC. 2801. ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR CONSTRUCTION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING.  
 
(a) ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT AND IMPROVE 
MILITARY HOUSING.--(1) Chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subchapter:  
 
SUBCHAPTER IV--ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING  
Sections: 
      2871. Definitions.  
      2872. General authority. 
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         2872a.  Utilities and Services.  (added by Public Law 106-398, 2001) 
      2873. Direct loans and loan guarantees. 
      2874. Leasing of housing to be constructed.  
      2875. Investments in nongovernmental entities. 
      2876. Rental guarantees.  
      2877. Differential lease payments. 
      2878. Conveyance or lease of existing property and facilities.  
      2879. Interim leases. 
      2880. Unit size and type.  
      2881. Ancillary supporting facilities.  (modified by Public Law 106-65) 
      2882. Assignment of members of the armed forces to housing units.  
      2883. Department of Defense Housing Funds. 
      2884. Reports.  
      2885. Expiration of authority.  
 
S 2871. Definitions.   In this subchapter:  
 
(a) The term `ancillary supporting facilities' means facilities related to military 
housing units, including child care centers, day care centers, tot lots, community centers, 
housing offices, dining facilities, unit offices, and other similar facilities for the support 
of military housing.  
 
(b) The term `base closure law' means the following: “(A) Section 2687 of this 
title. “(B) Title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and 
Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note). “(C) The Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Ac t of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 
U.S.C. 2687 note).  
 
(c) The term `construction' means the construction of military housing units and 
ancillary supporting facilities or the improvement or rehabilitation of existing units or 
ancillary supporting facilities.  
 
(d) The term `contract' includes any contract, lease, or other agreement entered 
into under the authority of this subchapter.  
 
(e) The term `Fund' means the Department of Defense Family Housing 
Improvement Fund or the Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied Housing 
Improvement Fund established under section 2883(a) of this title.  
 
(f) The term `military unaccompanied housing' means military housing intended 
to be occupied by members of the armed forces serving a tour of duty unaccompanied by 
dependents.  
 




S 2872. GENERAL AUTHORITY   
 
In addition to any other authority provided under this chapter for the acquisition 
or construction of military family housing or military unaccompanied housing, the 
Secretary concerned may exercise any authority or any combination of authorities 
provided under this subchapter in order to provide for the acquisition or construction by 
private persons of the following:  
 
      (1) Family housing units on or near military installations within the United States 
and its territories and possessions.  
 
      (2) Military unaccompanied housing units on or near such military installations.  
 
S 2872a. UTILITIES and SERVICES  (This section was added by the Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P.L. 106-398) 
 
 (a) Authority to Furnish.  The Secretary concerned may furnish utilities and 
services referred to in subsection (b) in connection with any military housing acquired or 
constructed pursuant to the exercise of any authority or combination of authorities under 
this subchapter if the military housing is located on a military installation.  
 
 (b) Covered Utilities and Services.  The utilities and services that may be 
furnished under subsection (a) are the following: 
 
  (1) Electric power. 
  (2) Steam. 
  (3) Compressed air. 
  (4) Water. 
  (5) Sewage and garbage disposal.  
  (6) Natural gas. 
  (7) Pest control.  
  (8) Snow and ice removal.  
  (9) Mechanical refrigeration. 
(10) Telecommunication services.  
 
 (c) Reimbursement.  The Secretary concerned shall be reimbursed for any 
utilities or services furnished under the subsection (a).  
 
 (2) The amount of any cash payment received under paragraph (1) shall be 
credited to the appropriation or working capital account from which the cost of furnishing 
the utilities or services concerned was paid.  Amounts so credited to an appropriation or 
account shall be merged with funds in such appropriation or account, and shall be 





S 2873. DIRECT LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES   
 
(a) Direct Loans.— 
 
            (1) Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary concerned may make direct 
loans to persons in the private sector in order to provide funds to such persons for the 
acquisition or construction of housing units that the Secretary determines are suitable for 
use as military family housing or as military unaccompanied housing.  
 
            (2) The Secretary concerned shall establish such terms and conditions with 
respect to loans made under this subsection as the Secretary considers appropriate to 
protect the interests of the United States, including the period and frequency for 
repayment of such loans and the obligations of the obligors on such loans upon default.  
 
(b) Loan Guarantees.— 
 
            (1) Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary concerned may guarantee a 
loan made to any person in the private sector if the proceeds of the loan are to be used by 
the person to acquire, or construct housing units that the Secretary determines are suitable 
for use as military family housing or as military unaccompanied housing.  
 
            (2) The amount of a guarantee on a loan that may be provided under 
paragraph (1) may not exceed the amount equal to the lesser of -  
 
                      (A) the amount equal to 80 percent of the value of the project; or  
                      (B) the amount of the outstanding principal of the loan.  
 
            (3) The Secretary concerned shall establish such terms and conditions with 
respect to guarantees of loans under this subsection as the Secretary considers appropriate 
to protect the interests of the United States, including the rights and obligations of 
obligors of such loans and  the rights and obligations of the United States with respect to 
such guarantees.  
 
(c) Limitation on Direct Loan and Guarantee Authority.--Direct loans and loan 
guarantees may be made under this section only to the extent that appropriations of 
budget authority to cover their cost (as defined in section 502(5) of the Federal Credit 
Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a(5))) are made in advance, or authority is otherwise 
provided in appropriation Acts. If such appropriation or other authority is provided, there 
may be established a financing account (as defined in section 502(7) of such Act (2 
U.S.C. 661a(7))), which shall be available for the disbursement of direct loans or 
payment of claims for payment on loan guarantees under this section and for all other 
cash flows to and from the Government as a result of direct loans and guarantees made 





S 2874. LEASING OF HOUSING TO BE CONSTRUCTED   
 
(a) Build And Lease Authorized.--The Secretary concerned may enter into 
contracts for the lease of military family housing units or military unaccompanied 
housing units to be constructed under this subchapter.  
 
(b) Lease Terms.--A contract under this section may be for any period that the 
Secretary concerned determines appropriate and may provide for the  owner of the leased 
property to operate and maintain the property.  
 
S 2875. INVESTMENTS IN NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES   
 
(a) Investments Authorized.--The Secretary concerned may make investments in 
nongovernmental entities carrying out projects for the acquisition or construction of 
housing units suitable for use as military family housing or as military unaccompanied 
housing.  
 
(b) Forms of Investment.--An investment under this section may take the form of 
an acquisition of a limited partnership interest by the United States, a purchase of stock or 
other equity instruments by the United States, a purchase of bonds or other debt 
instruments by the United States, or any combination of such forms of investment.  
 
(c) Limitation on Value of Investment.— 
 
            (1) The cash amount of an investment under this section in a 
nongovernmental entity may not exceed an amount equal to 33 \1/3\ percent of the capital 
cost (as determined by the Secretary concerned) of the project or projects that the entity 
proposes to carry out under this section with the investment.  
 
            (2) If the Secretary concerned conveys land or facilities to a 
nongovernmental entity as all or part of an investment in the entity under this section, the 
total value of the investment by th e Secretary under this section may not exceed an 
amount equal to 45 percent of the capital cost (as determined by the Secretary) of the 
project or projects that the entity proposes to carry out under this section with the 
investment.  
 
            (3) In this subsection, the term `capital cost', with respect to a project for 
the acquisition or construction of housing, means the total amount of the costs included in 
the basis of the housing for Federal income tax purposes.  
 
(d) Collateral Incentive Agreements.--The Secretary concerned shall enter into 
collateral incentive agreements with nongovernmental entities in which the Secretary 
makes an investment under this section to ensure that a suitable preference will be 
afforded members of the armed forces and their dependents in the lease or purchase, as 
the case may be, of a reasonable number of the housing units covered by the investment.  
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S 2876. RENTAL GUARANTEES   
 
The Secretary concerned may enter into agreements with private persons that acquire or 
construct military family housing units or military unaccompanied housing units under 
this subchapter in order to assure the occupancy of such units at levels specified in the 
agreements; or rental income derived from rental of such units at levels specified in  the 
agreements.  
 
S 2877. DIFFERENTIAL LEASE PAYMENTS   
 
Pursuant to an agreement entered into by the Secretary concerned and a private lessor of 
military family housing or military unaccompanied housing to members of the armed 
forces, the Secretary may pay the lessor an amount in addition to the rental payments for 
the housing made by the members as the Secretary determines appropriate to encourage 
the lessor to make the housing available to members of the armed forces as military 
family housing or as military unaccompanied housing.  
 
S 2878. CONVEYANCE OR LEASE OF EXISTING PROPERTY AND 
FACILITIES   
 
(a) Conveyance or Lease Authorized.--The Secretary concerned may convey or 
lease property or facilities (including ancillary supporting facilities) to private persons for 
purposes of using the proceeds of such conveyance or lease to carry out activities under 
this subchapter.  
 
(b) Inapplicability To Property At Installation Approved For Closure. --The 
authority of this section does not apply to property or facilities located on or near a 
military installation approved for closure under a base closure law.  
 
(c) Terms and Conditions.— 
 
            (1) The conveyance or lease of property or facilities under this section 
shall be for such consideration and upon such terms and conditions as the Secretary 
concerned considers appropriate for the purposes of this subchapter and to protect the 
interests of the United States.  
 
            (2) As part or all of the consideration for a conveyance or lease under this 
section, the purchaser or lessor (as the case may be) shall enter into an agreement with 
the Secretary to ensure that a suitable preference will be afforded members of the armed 
forces and their dependents in the lease or sublease of a reasonable number of the 
housing units covered by the conveyance or lease, as the case may be, or in the lease of 
other suitable housing units made available by the purchaser or lessee.  
 
(d) Innaplicability of Certain Property Management Laws.--The conveyance or 
lease of property or  facilities under this section shall not be subject to the following 
provisions of law:  
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            (1) Section 2667 of this title.  
            (2) The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 
U.S.C. 471 et seq.).  
            (3) Section 321 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (commonly known as the 
Economy Act) (40 U.S.C. 303b).  
            (4) Section 501 of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 
U.S.C. 11401).  
 
S 2879. INTERIM LEASES   
 
Pending completion of a project to acquire or construct military family housing 
units or military unaccompanied housing units under this subchapter, the Secretary 
concerned may provide for the interim lease of such units of the project as are complete. 
The term of a lease under this section may not extend beyond the date of the completion 
of the project concerned.  
 
S 2880. UNIT SIZE AND TYPE  
 
(a) Conformity with Similar Housing Units In Locale.--The Secretary concerned 
shall ensure that the room patterns and floor areas of military family hou sing units and 
military unaccompanied housing units acquired or constructed under this subchapter are 
generally comparable to the room patterns and floor areas of similar housing units in the 
locality concerned.  
 
(b) Inapplicability of Limitations on Space by Pay Grade.— 
 
            (1) Section 2826 of this title shall not apply to military family housing 
units acquired or constructed under this subchapter.  
 
            (2) The regulations prescribed under section 2856 of this title shall not 
apply to any military unaccompanied housing unit acquired or constructed under this 
subchapter unless the unit is located on a military installation.  
 
S 2881. ANCILLARY SUPPORTING FACILITIES   (Section (b) was added by the 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 106-65) 
 
(a) Authority to Acquire or Construct.   Any project for the acquisition or 
construction of military family housing units or military unaccompanied housing units 
under this subchapter may include the acquisition or construction of an cillary supporting 
facilities for the housing units concerned.  
 
(b) Restriction.  A project referred to in subsection (a) may not include the 
acquisition or construction of an ancillary supporting facility if, as determined by the 
Secretary concerned, the facility is to be used for providing merchandise or services in 
direct competition with: 
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 (1) the Army and Air Force Exchange Service; 
 (2) the Navy Exchange Service Command; 
 (3) a Marine Corps exchange; 
 (4) the Defense Commissary Agency; or  
 (5) any non-appropriated fund activity of the Department of defense for 
morale, welfare, and recreation of the members of the armed forces.  
 
S 2882. ASSIGNMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES TO 
HOUSING UNITS   
 
(a) In General.--The Secretary concerned may assign members of the armed 
forces to housing units acquired or constructed under this subchapter.  
  
(b) Effect of Certain Assignments on Entitlement To Housing Allowances .— 
 
            (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), housing referred to in subsection 
(a) shall be considered as quarters of the United States or a housing facility under the 
jurisdiction of a uniformed service for purposes of section 403(b) of title 37.  
 
            (2) A member of the armed forces who is assigned in accordance with 
subsection (a) to a housing unit not owned or leased by the United States shall be entitled 
to a basic allowance for quarters under section 403 of title 37 and, if in a high housing 
cost area, a variable housing allowance under section 403a of that title.  
 
(c) Lease Payments Through Pay Allotments.--The Secretary concerned may 
require members of the armed forces who lease housing in housing units acquired or 
constructed under this subchapter to make lease payments for such housing pursuant to 
allotments of the pay of such members under section 701 of title 37.  
 
S 2883. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOUSING FUNDS   
 
(a) Establishment.--There are hereby established on the books of the Treasury the 
following accounts:  
       The Department of Defense Family Housing Improvement Fund.  
       The Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied Housing 
Improvement Fund.  
 
(b) Commingling of Funds Prohibited.— 
 
            (1) The Secretary of Defense shall administer each Fund separately.  
 
            (2) Amounts in the Department of Defense Family Housing Improvement 
Fund may be used only to carry out activities under this subchapter with respect to 
military family housing.  
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            (3) Amounts in the Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied 
Housing Improvement Fund may be used only to carry out activities under this 
subchapter with respect to military unaccompanied housing.  
 
(c) Credits to Funds.— 
 
            (1) There shall be credited to the Department of Defense Family Housing 
Improvement Fund the following: 
 
                      (A) Amounts authorized for and appropriated to that Fund.  
 
                      (B) Subject to subsection (f), any amounts that the Secretary of 
Defense transfers, in such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts, to that Fund from 
amounts authorized and appropriated to the Department of Defense for the acquisition or 
construction of military family housing. 
 
                      (C) Proceeds from the conveyance or lease of property or facilities 
under section 2878 of this title for the pu rpose of carrying out activities under this 
subchapter with respect to military family housing. 
 
                      (D) Income derived from any activities under this subchapter with 
respect to military family housing, including interest on loans made un der section 2873 of 
this title, income and gains realized from investments under section 2875 of this title, and 
any return of capital invested as part of such investments.  
 
            (2) There shall be credited to the Department of Defense Military 
Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund the following: 
 
                      (A) Amounts authorized for and appropriated to that Fund.  
 
                      (B) Subject to subsection (f), any amounts that the Secretary of 
Defense transfers, in such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts, to that Fund from 
amounts authorized and appropriated to the Department of Defense for the acquisition or 
construction of military unaccompanied housing.  
 
                      (C) Proceeds from the conveyance or lease of property or facilities 
under section 2878 of this title for the purpose of carrying out activities under this 
subchapter with respect to military unaccompanied housing.  
 
                      (D) Income derived from any activities under this subchapter with 
respect to military unaccompanied housing, including interest on loans made under 
section 2873 of this title, income and gains realized from investments under section 2875 





(d) Use of Amounts In Funds.— 
 
            (1) In such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts and except as 
provided in subsection (e), the Secretary of Defense may use amounts in the Department 
of Defense Family Housing Improvement Fund to carry out  activities under this 
subchapter with respect to military family housing, including activities required in 
connection with the planning, execution, and administration of contracts entered into 
under the authority of this subchapter.  
 
            (2) In such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts and except as 
provided in subsection (e), the Secretary of Defense may use amounts in the Department 
of Defense Military Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund to carry out activities 
under this subchapter with respect to military unaccompanied housing, including 
activities required in connection with the planning, execution, and administration of 
contracts entered into under the authority of this subchapter.  
 
             (3) Amounts made available under this subsection shall remain available 
until expended. The Secretary of Defense may transfer amounts made available under 
this subsection to the Secretaries of the military departments to permit such Secretaries to 
carry out the activities for which such amounts may be used.  
 
(e) Limitation on Obligations.--The Secretary may not incur an obligation under 
a contract or other agreement entered into under this subchapter in excess of the 
unobligated balance, at the time the contract is entered into, of the Fund required to be 
used to satisfy the obligation.  
 
(f) Notification Required For Transfers.--A transfer of appropriated amounts to a 
Fund under paragraph (1)(B) or (2)(B) of subsection (c) may be made only after the end 
of the 30-day period beginning on the date the Secretary of Defense submits written 
notice of, and justification for, the transfer to the appropriate committees of Congress.  
 
(g) Limitation on Amount of Budget Authority .--The total value in budget 
authority of all contracts and investments undertaken using the authorities provided in 
this subchapter shall not exceed--  
 
            (1) $850,000,000 for the acquisition or construction of military family 
housing; and  
 
            (2) $150,000,000 for the acquisition or construction of military 








S 2884. REPORTS   
 
(a) Project Reports.— 
 
            (1) The Secretary of Defense shall transmit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report describing— 
 
                      (A) each contract for the acquisition or construction of family 
housing units or unaccompanied housing units that the Secretary proposes to solicit under 
this subchapter; and 
 
                      (B) each conveyance or lease proposed under section 2878 of this 
title.  
 
           (2) The report shall describe the proposed contract, conveyance, or lease 
and the intended method of participation of the United States in the contract, conveyance, 
or lease and provide a justification of such method of participation. The report shall be 
submitted not later  than 30 days before the date on which the Secretary issues the 
contract solicitation or offers the conveyance or lease.  
 
(b) Annual Reports.--The Secretary of Defense shall include each year in the 
materials that the Secretary submits to Congress in support of the budget submitted by the 
President pursuant to section 1105 of title 31 the following: 
 
            (1) A report on the expenditures and receipts during the preceding fiscal 
year covering the Funds established under section 2883 of this title.  
 
            (2) A methodology for evaluating the extent and effectiveness of the use 
of the authorities under this subchapter during such preceding fiscal year.  
 
            (3) A description of the objectives of the Department of Defense for 
providing military family housing and military unaccompanied housing for members of 
the armed forces.  
 
S 2885. EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY   
 
(a) The authority to enter into a contract under this subchapter shall expire five 
years after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1996. 
  
(b) The table of subchapters at the beginning of such chapter is amended by 
inserting after the item relating to subchapter III the following new item:  IV. Alternative 
Authority for Acquisition and Improvement of 2871.  Military Housing. 
 
(c) Final Report. -- Not later than March 1, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the use by the Secretary of 
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Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments of the authorities provided by 
subchapter IV of chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a). 
The report shall assess the effectiveness of such authority in providing for the 




APPENDIX C.  ALTERNATIVE AUTHORIZATIONS RANKED BY 
BUDGET IMPACT 
THE PRIVATIZATION AUTHORITIES  
 
The Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) provides the Department with a 
variety of authorities with different benefits and budgetary impacts.  The chart below lists 
the twelve basic authorities and describes their benefits and budget impacts.  It also 
indicates which of 16 awarded projects used those authorities.  
 
Authority  Section  Description  Benefit  Budget Impact  
(1) 
Where Used  
Conveyance or 
Lease of Land 
and Units (2) 
2878  DoD may transfer 
ownership of units 
and land by fee 
simple conveyance 





Cash flow from 
units allows for 
additional private 
sector debt to fill 
financing gap  
None  Lackland AFB, TX –  
     land lease 
MCB Camp Pendleton, CA  
     – conveyance of units  
     and land lease 
Robins AFB, GA –  
     conveyance of units and 
     land lease 
Fort Carson, CO & 
Elmendorf AFB, AK –  
     conveyance of units and 
     land lease 
Fort Hood, TX 
NC San Diego, CA  
NC New Orleans, LA  
NC South Texas, TX 
Fort Meade, MD  
Fort Lewis, WA  
Unit Size and 
Type  
2880  DoD can build to 
local standards  
Results in more 
cost-effective 
development 
None  Lackland AFB, TX 
Fort Carson, CO  
NS Everett, WA 
NAS Corpus Christi, TX 
NS Everett II, WA 
NAS Kingsville, TX 
MCB Camp Pendleton, CA  
Dyess AFB, TX 
Robins AFB, GA 
Elmendorf AFB, AK 




2881  DoD can al low 
private sector to 
construct ancillary 
support facilities for 
the housing 
development (e.g., 
play areas, jogging 
trails)  
Enhances quality 
of life for military 
tenants.  
None  Lackland AFB, TX 
Fort Carson, CO  
NS Everett, WA 
NAS Corpus Christi, TX 
NS Everett II, WA 
NAS Kingsville, TX 
MCB Camp Pendleton, CA  
Dyess AFB, TX 
Robins AFB, GA 
Elmendorf AFB, AK  
NC San Diego, CA  
Fort Hood, TX 
NC New Orleans, LA  
NC South Texas, TX 
Fort Lewis, WA  
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Authority  Section  Description  Benefit  Budget Impact  
(1) 
Where Used  
Fort Meade, MD  
Payments by 
Allotment  
2882(c) DoD can require 
tenants to pay rents 




uncertainty of late 
payments and non-
payment of rent  
None  Lackland AFB, TX 
Fort Carson, CO  
NS Everett II, WA 
NAS Kingsville, TX 
MCB Camp Pendleton, CA  
Dyess AFB, TX 
Elmendorf AFB, AK  
Loan Guarantees 
(3) 
2873  DoD can guaranty 







4% - 7% of loan 
amount for limited 
base closure 
guarantee  
Fort Carson, CO  
Lackland AFB, TX 
Robins AFB, GA 
Elmendorf AFB, A K  






interest rates  




Lackland AFB, TX 
Dyess AFB, TX 
Robins AFB, GA 
Kingsville NAS, TX 
MCB Camp Pendleton, CA 




2877  DoD can provide an 
additional rental 
payment directly to 





Net present value 
of DLPs over life 
of contract  
NS Everett, WA 
NAS Corpus Christi, TX  
NC San Diego, CA  
Investments 
(Joint Venture)  
2875  DoD can provide 
equity investment  
DoD obtains an 
interest in the 
business entity that 
does the project  
Cash equity 
contribution is 
scored at 100% 
upfront  
NS Everett, WA 
NAS Corpus Christi, TX 
NS Everett II, WA 
Kingsville NAS, TX  
Fort Hood, TX 
NC San Diego, CA  
NC New Orleans, LA  
NC South Texas, TX 
Interim Leases  2879  DoD can lease 
privatized units for 
an interim period  




Net present value 










DoD can assign 
members to 





Net present value 
of rental stream 
generated by 
assigned members  
None  
Build to Lease  2874  DoD can contract for 
the private sector to 
build and maintain 
units for lease by 
DoD  
Central payment 
by DoD in stead of 
tenant – analogous 
to 801 Program  
Net present value 
of lease payme nts  
None  
Rental Guaranty  2876  DoD can guaranty 






analogous to 802 
Program  
Net present value 




Legend. AFB.  Air Force Base 
MCB.  Marine Corps Base 
NAS.  Naval Air Station 
NC.  Naval Complex 
NS.  Naval Station 
 
This data was presented to the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the House Appropriations Committee, on 13 




(1)  Scoring in accordance with the Federal Credit Reform Act and Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, OMB Circular A -
11, and OMB MHPI Guidelines of 25 June 1997.  
 
(2)  Because base land usually produces no reven ue stream, and thereby has no impact on budget surpluses and deficits, 
“pay-as-you-go” provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act require that it be scored at 0%.  
 
(3)  Scores for private source loan guarantees are calculated based on the degree of “exposure ,” or probability of default 
by the project’s contractor under severely constrained conditions such as base closure.  
 
(4)  Scores for DOD direct loans are calculated using the difference between the interest rate negotiated between the 
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APPENDIX D.  AWARDED PROJECTS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2001 
Fort Carson, Colorado.  Awarded September 1999 to J.A. Jones  
Government: 1.  Convey all existing units to developer  
  2.  Lease 777 acres of land to developer  
  3.  Provide first mortgage guarantee against developer default due to base 
closure, downsizing or deployment 
Developer: 1.  Renovate 1,823 units 
  2.  Construct 840 units on base (leased land) 
  3.  Own, operate and maintain 2,663 units for 50 years  
 
Fort Hood, Texas.  Awarded October 2001 to Lend Lease Actus  
Government: 1.  Convey all existing units to developer  
  2.  Lease underlying land to developer  
  3.  Provide an equity investment and become a limited partner  
Developer: 1.  Renovate 4,624 units 
  2.  Convert 630 two-bedroom units to 315 four-bedroom units 
3.  Construct 973 new units on base 
  3.  Own, operate and maintain 5,912 units for 50 years  
 
Lackland AFB, Texas.  Awarded August 1998 to Landmark 
Government: 1.  Lease 96 acres to developer  
  2.  Provide a second mortgage 
  3.  Provide a first mortgage guarantee against developer default due to 
base closure, downsizing or deployment 
Developer: 1.  Demolish 272 existing units 
  2.  Construct 420 new units on base 





Robins AFB, Georgia.  Awarded September 2000 to Hunt Building Corp. 
Government: 1.  Convey 670 units and 270 acres of land to developer  
  2.  Provide a second mortgage 
  3.  Provide a first mortgage guarantee against developer default due to 
base closure, downsizing or deployment 
Developer: 1.  Demolish 370 existing units 
  2.  Construct 370 new units on conveyed land 
  3.  Renovate 300 units 
4.  Own, operate and maintain 670 units for 30 years (may be extended for 
two additional 10-year periods) 
 
Dyess AFB, Texas.  Awarded September 2000 to Hunt Building Corp. 
Government: 1.  Provide a first mortgage loan 
Developer: 1.  Construct 402 new units on private land, off -base 
  3.  Own, operate and maintain 402 units for 40 years 
 
Elmendorf AFB, Alaska.  Awarded March 2001 to Aurora Military Housing LLC 
Government: 1.  Convey 584 existing units 
2.  Lease 219 acres to developer  
  3.  Provide a second mortgage loan 
  4.  Provide a first mortgage guarantee against developer default due to 
base closure, downsizing or deployment 
Developer: 1.  Demolish 176 existing units 
  2.  Construct 420 new units on base 
  3.  Renovate 200 units 






Corpus Christi NAS and Kingsville NAS, Texas.  Awarded July 1996 to Landmark  
Government: 1.  Provide an equity investment and become a limited partner  
Developer: 1.  Construct 404 new units on developer provided land, off base 
  2.  Own, operate and maintain 404 units for 10 years 
 
Everett NS, Washington.  Awarded March 1997 to Dujardin  
Government: 1.  Provide an equity investment and become a limited partner  
  2.  Provide differential lease payments  
Developer: 1.  Construct 185 new units 
  2.  Own, operate and maintain 185 units for 10 years 
 
Kingsville -2 NAS, Texas.  Awarded November 2000 to Hunt Building Corp. 
Government: 1.  Convey 244 existing units and 30 acres to developer  
  2.  Provide an equity investment and become a limited partner  
  3.  Provide a second mortgage loan 
Developer: 1.  Construct 150 new units on developer-provided land off-base 
  3.  Own, operate and maintain 150 units for 30 years with a Navy option 
to terminate anytime after 15 years  
 
Everett-2 NS, Washington.  Awarded December 2000 to Gateway 
Government: 1.  Provide an equity investment and become a limited partner  
  2.  Supplement service member’s rental payments with differential lease 
payments over the first 15 years.  
Developer: 1.  Construct 288 new units on private land off-base 
  3.  Own, operate and maintain 288 units for 30 years with a Navy option 







Camp Pendleton MCB, California.   
Awarded November 2000 to Hunt Building Corp. 
Government: 1.  Convey 512 existing units 
2.  Lease 132 acres to developer 
  3.  Provide a second mortgage loan 
Developer: 1.  Demolish 312 existing units 
  2.  Construct 512 new units on base 
  3.  Renovate 200 units 
4.  Own, operate and maintain 712 units for 50 years 
 
San Diego NC, California.   
Awarded August 2001 to Lincoln Property Co. and Clark Realty Capital LLC 
Government: 1.  Convey 2,660 existing units  
2.  Lease underlying land to developer  
  3.  Provide an equity investment and become a limited partner  
Developer: 1.  Demolish 812 existing units 
  2.  Construct 1,400 new units on the leased land 
  3.  Own, operate and maintain 3,248 units for 50 years  
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